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There is currently an unsolved problem in the
legal literature regarding the role cost-benefit
analysis should play in determinations of
breach in negligence cases. Additionally,
despite extensive writings, the relationship
between duty and breach in negligence cases
remains unclear. At the core of the problem lies
the inadequacy of our understanding of
breach, which is currently established through
multiple independent constructs that lack a
shared fundamental conceptual base. Further
complicating matters is the limited study
afforded the nature of the negligence cause of
action itself, which leaves the element of duty
on unsound footing. This note fills those gaps.
In analyzing breach, the note provides a
framework for understanding the negligence
cause of action and duty. The note then asserts
that an actor’s given conduct is in negligent
breach of a duty if (and only if) a reasonable
person would have foreseen the nonattainment
of the duty’s demanded result and a costbenefit analysis weighs against the actor. This
note concludes with the application of this
framework to the oft-maligned element of
proximate cause. Proximate cause in the
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negligence cause of action is fundamentally
linked to breach, and this note clarifies some of
the uncertainty around proximate cause using
its unique duty/breach analysis.

I. INTRODUCTION
This note is a conceptual study of breaches in
negligence cases. Traditionally, breach has been established
by a collection of independent constructs, such as
foreseeability, adherence to custom, adherence to one’s
purported standards, violation of statutes, risk/utility
analysis, and notice and opportunity to cure. This
hodgepodge of constructs is conceptually and procedurally
unsatisfactory. This existing theoretical patchwork fails to
provide a fundamental theory of negligent breach. The
hodgepodge
necessitates
inelegant
and inefficient
argumentation of separate (yet intersecting) constructs that
produce awkward conclusions.
This note offers a theoretical approach that unifies
the existing, disparate theories. It argues that the various
constructs of breach can be subsumed under a particular
combination of foreseeability and cost/benefit analysis that
results in procedural simplicity and theoretical cohesion.
This synthesis precisely captures the notion of “negligent
breach” as—an act (or inaction) is in negligent breach of a
duty if and only if it foreseeably results in the nonattainment
of the duty’s demanded outcome and a costs and benefits
assessment of the act (or inaction) weighs against the actor.
Both these elements have venerable roots. Foreseeability is
at the core of negligence, playing an important or decisive
role in the elements of duty, breach, and proximate
causation. Cost/benefit analysis is the primary focus of law
and economics in negligence cases.
Two preliminary clarifications are in order. First, this
note adopts the broad, ordinary meaning of “duty”: “[a]ction,
or an act, that is due in the way of moral or legal obligation;
that which one ought or is bound to do; an obligation.” 1 Any
* I thank Professor Ellen Bublick of the University of Arizona for
valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. I also thank the staff
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duty we have, such as a statutory or contractual duty, will
satisfy this definition. In other words, I am separating the
notion of duty from the general duty of care. However, this
note exclusively considers legal duties, as opposed to moral
ones.2
Second, my analysis focuses on the law as developed
and applied by the appellate courts. I make no claims to
explaining the thinking of individual jurors as they consider
negligence cases. The law, of course, must still be read to the
jury in jury instructions.
The body of this note proceeds as follows. Part II
separates duties into two categories, results-based duties,
which explicitly demand a specific result, and conduct-based
duties, which do not. Courts engage in a more extensive
analysis of negligence when the duty in question is conductbased, as opposed to results-based. Part III considers
intentional breaches. Unlike negligent breach, intentional
breach demands that the actor desire the consequences that
constitute breach or be substantially certain that the
consequences will occur. Part IV analyzes negligent breaches
of results-based duties in case law and argues that a resultsbased duty is breached negligently if a reasonable person
would have foreseen the non-occurrence of the duty’s result.
Part V investigates negligent breaches of conduct-based
duties, which are more common. Part V, which is the primary
part of this note, analytically establishes that the ordinary
constructs considered in cases of negligent breach are
equivalent to a two-step inquiry: (1) Would a reasonable
person have foreseen the non-occurrence of the underlying
result of the duty, and if so, (2) did a cost-benefit analysis
weigh against the actor? Results-based duties only demand
the first prong of the analysis, and this note explains that the
specificity of the demanded result in results-based duties
obviates the cost-benefit inquiry of the second prong. It
suggests, however, that a better approach is to use the
general analysis in both cases, noting as a special cost in the
at Lincoln Memorial University Law Review for excellent editorial
assistance. All errors are mine.
Duty, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). The Oxford English
Dictionary recognizes this as the primary current sense of the word. Id.
2 The classic moral example is of a person in a room, smoking a cigarette
and watching a person in the street being beaten to death by a stranger.
There is no legal duty to act.
1
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cost-benefit inquiry of the second prong the non-attainment
of a result that was explicitly demanded by the duty, without
assuming a priori that the second prong would be met.

II. DUTIES CAN BE RESULTS-BASED OR CONDUCT-BASED

In contrast to this note’s unified thesis, a review of
appellate cases shows that courts treat breaches differently
depending on whether the duty breached is a “results-based”
duty or a “conduct-based” duty. The present Part clarifies
the distinction between “results-based” and “conduct-based”
duties.
A duty is results-based if and only if it demands a
specific result. For example, a contractual duty to pick
someone up at 4:00 p.m. on a certain day of the week is a
results-based duty. A duty is conduct-based if and only if it
is concerned with a person’s conduct, as opposed to specific
results from that conduct. The common law general duty of
care with which negligence is often associated is the
quintessential conduct-based duty.3 The fiduciary duty of
care for corporate officers and directors is another example.4
Common carriers have the conduct-based duty of
exercising the utmost care and diligence.5 A possessor of land
owes licensees a conduct-based duty of reasonable care for
his activities on the land, 6 and a duty to warn or to exercise
reasonable care to make safe both natural and artificial

“[T]he standard of conduct to which [an actor] must conform to avoid
being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
4 “A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the
director’s or officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected
to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.” 1-4
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
5 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (Deering 2020) (“A carrier of persons for
reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage,
must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to
that end a reasonable degree of skill.”)
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 341.
3
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conditions on the land.7 The duty to warn, standing
independently, would have been results-based. The duty to
exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe is
conduct-based. A duty to make the condition safe would have
been results-based. On the other hand, no duty of reasonable
care is owed to undiscovered trespassers.8
As a borderline example, if a child’s caretaker has the
contractual duty to act in such a way that the child is happy,
then that caretaker would have a conduct-based duty. If, on
the other hand, the caretaker has the duty to keep the child
happy at all times, then the caretaker would have a resultsbased duty.
Conduct-based and results-based duties interact.
Conduct-based duties can result in other, less general,
duties, or even specific results-based ones. For example, the
fiduciary duty of care requires that directors and officers
“keep informed about the activities of the corporation.”9 This
is a conduct-based duty. It also requires that directors and
officers avoid violations of positive law.10 This would be a
results-based duty. Of particular interest is when a conductbased duty splits into or is otherwise satisfied by other
duties. For example, The American Law Institute
recommends that if three duties are satisfied and there is no
conflict of interest, then the fiduciary duty of care is
satisfied.11
The general duty of care with which negligence is
often associated, and which is a duty to act in such a way as

Id. § 342. The idea is to make the land as safe as it appears or disclose
that it is not. Id. cmt. e.
8 Id. § 333. As an organizational matter, to determine the duties owed by
landowners to those on the land, traditionally one generally determines
the status of the entrant (trespasser, licensee, etc.) and the danger in
question (natural condition, activity by landowner, etc.). See id. §§ 328E350.
9 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981); see
generally 1-4 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a)(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 2005).
10 Roth v. Robertson, 118 N.Y.S. 351, 353 (Sup. Ct. 1909); 1-4 PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(a) cmt. d (“[A] director or officer violates
the duty to perform his or her functions in good faith if he or she knowingly
causes the corporation to disobey the law.”).
11 1-4 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c). This formulation
is in line with current law. See id.
7
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not to cause others an unreasonable risk of harm,12 enjoys
the most joyful group of such permutations. This often raises
theoretical questions as to what is and is not related to the
general duty of care. For example, the Arizona Supreme
Court once stated that the duty owed by common carriers to
passengers is but the general duty of care measured by the
reasonable and prudent person standard, interpreting that
duty to imply a heightened standard.13 The California
Supreme Court has held that landowners owe to entrants,
not special duties, but the general duty of care measured by
the reasonable and prudent person standard (in this case to
change the substantive requirements).14
I shall argue in a separate paper that the general duty
of care is a social contract duty that arises from and, in that
regard, is limited to the conduct-based duty that we owe each
other precisely because we have congregated to live together
as a society.15 Results-based duties, arising by definition
from special relationships instead of individuals’
membership in a society, are separate from this duty.
Motivated by this social contract duty, one can
nonetheless reinterpret it and say that there is a constant
duty to avoid creating unreasonable risks of harm to others,
all circumstances considered, including in it thereby all the
special relationships such as statutes, contracts, and family.
The duties resulting from the special relationships may or
may not completely cover the general duty; additionally, they
exist independently.16
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). This
expansion helps understand when breach of the duty occurs, because it
provides the content of the duty.
13 Nunez v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt. of Tucson, Inc., 271 P.3d 1104, 1106-09
(Ariz. 2012).
14 Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564-69 (Cal. 1968).
15 It is also the only conduct-based duty of care, and accounts for all
situations—situations that inevitably arise—for which specific protective
laws do not exist.
16 For example, the statement that a landowner owes a duty of reasonable
care to discovered trespassers, to licensees, and to invitees with respect to
active operations, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 336, 341, 341A, is
nothing but a restatement of the basic general duty of care applied against
landowners in favor of those entrants. On the other hand, it is misleading
to say that a landowner has no duty of reasonable care to undiscovered
trespassers, since the basic general duty of care still exists. However, as
we shall see later in the paper, there can never be breach of this duty in
12
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Under this interpretation, the general duty of care
ceases to be a social contract duty and must be imposed by
the government. Furthermore, and at least equally
importantly, it ceases to be a necessary duty.17 This note
adopts the extended version of the general duty of care
because it is easier to explain court opinions through it.18
The separation of duties into the results-based and
the conduct-based that I introduced at the beginning of this
section is not of particular interest in understanding duties
themselves. It is, however, useful in understanding negligent
breaches. Before considering negligent breaches, however, it
would be useful to briefly consider intentional breaches.

III. INTENTIONAL BREACHES

Since a given act that is in breach of a given duty
cannot constitute both an intentional and a negligent breach

such a context. A company that releases asbestos into society should be
concerned about the basic general duty of care. Similarly, a chemist who,
in an effort to find his way back to his home after a visit to his
grandmother’s new dwelling, leaves behind a trail of TNT, should also be
concerned about that duty. In both these latter cases, no legal relationship
exists between the potential plaintiffs and defendants; hence we consider
the general duty of care at its rudimentary level. Nevertheless, if one
existed, an additional duty would be added because of it, and
independently of membership in society. This duty would then alter the
general duty of care in that context.
The general duty of care can be abrogated; for example, because no
contractual principle exists preventing its curtailment, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 178-96 (AM. LAW INST. 1981), one can remove
the duty by contracting out of it. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 2 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2000) (considering
special cases where an overall indemnification for negligence would be
unenforceable). In the ultimate analysis, though, if there is a contract
abrogating the duty, the contract is simply part of “all the circumstances.”
17 Thus, a court that ignores the social contract basis for the general duty
of care could well decide to remove it entirely, as the Arizona Supreme
Court did in Quiroz v. Alcoa Inc., 416 P.3d 824 (Ariz. 2018).
18 The alternative would have been to keep the social contract duty and
the special relationship duties separate.
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of that duty,19 it is helpful to say a few words on intentional
breaches.
A person who acts with intent “desires to cause
consequences of his act, or . . . believes that the consequences
are substantially certain to result from it.”20 As such, a
breach is intentional if the actor desires to cause the
consequences that constitute breach, or has substantial
certainty that the consequences will occur.21 Intent to
breach, in the ordinary sense of the phrase, is not required,
insofar as lack of knowledge of the law is no defense. 22
Conduct-based duties can be breached intentionally just as
well as results-based ones: because conduct-based duties
often come in the form “act in such a way that x,” any
intentional act that guarantees “not x” would be an
intentional breach by this definition.23
It is a fundamental aspect of American jurisprudence
that one needs a legal theory (a “cause of action,” if the
procedural aspect shall be emphasized) to bring suit. 24
Sometimes, the legal theory is essentially the statute
establishing the duty;25 at other times, as with the negligence

Ryan v. Napier, 425 P.3d 230, 235-36 (Ariz. 2018). Of course, a given act
can constitute an intentional and negligent breach of different duties. For
example, suppose a housekeeper has a contractual duty never to have any
oil (spilled) on the floor. One day, frustrated at being subject to such a
specific duty, the housekeeper picks an oil bottle and pours oil on the floor
of the entrance hall 10 minutes before the homeowners’ usual arrival time.
The homeowners arrive early, slip on the oil, and are injured. The act of
pouring oil on the floor is an intentional breach of the contractual duty and
a negligent breach of the general duty of care.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
21 Id.
22 Ignorantia legis non excusat. E.g., Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,
218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910); Ga. Code Ann. § 1-3-6 (2020).
23 This is not to say that the intentional breach will have any practical
significance. For example, if a person walking down the street decides to
and beats a stranger with a bat, that would be an intentional breach of the
general duty of care. However, aside from the lack of existence of a remedy
for this intentional breach, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Division
1, this act would be tackled under battery, id. §§ 13-16.
24 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Original Source of the
Cause of Action in Federal Courts: The Example of the Alien Tort Statute,
101 VA. L. REV. 609, 631-37 (2015) (providing historical background);
Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the
Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861,
864-73 (1996).
25 See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 24, at 861 n.1.
19
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cause of action, it runs across various duties. 26 As such, in
the US, there exists a world of duties and rights, the “law” as
one would ordinarily understand the word, and a different
world of “causes of action.”27 “Intentional breach of duty” is
not a legal cause of action and there instead exist multiple
causes of action intended to account for harms caused by
intentional breaches of tort duties.28

IV. NEGLIGENT BREACHES OF RESULTS-BASED DUTIES

A results-based duty is breached negligently if the
non-attainment of its result was foreseeable. This Part
clarifies that idea by analyzing appellate cases.
Since the difference between a results-based and a
conduct-based duty is the difference between “x” and “act in
such a way that x” (e.g., as a reasonable and prudent person),
the fundamental problem is, compared to conduct-based
duties, what recognition should be given to a result-based
duty’s outright demand of a particular result. In the case of
a results-based duty, one would expect that breaches would
be found more readily. Contrast this with conduct-based
duties, where one would expect breaches found less readily.
With whatever greater ease negligent breaches of
specific duties shall be found, that ease is not mere failure to
execute. There is a fundamental difference between
negligence and strict liability: negligence imputes, and by
extension demands, greater fault. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that violations of the Safety Appliance Act, a
federal act intended to promote safety in railroad

E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 341, 388.
This note does not consider, and passes no judgment on, (1) the
procedural efficiency of this approach; (2) the existence, or nonexistence,
of normative justifications for it; (3) the interpretation of ingenious
violations of horizontal separation of powers in the creation of laws that of
themselves leave out the judiciary. See generally Stabile, supra note 24, at
864 n.14 (providing sources arguing for the essential relationship between
a law and its enforceability).
28 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Division 1.
26
27
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operations,29 are subject to strict liability.30 It has explained
that this liability “is not based upon the carrier’s negligence.
The duty imposed is an absolute one and the carrier is not
excused by any showing of care however assiduous.” 31
Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that
violations of the Pure Food Act, which guarantees the quality
of food in certain specific senses,32 result in strict liability.33
In explaining its ruling, the court stated: “We construe that
decision as holding that the liability of [D]efendant for
selling unwholesome food exists independently of any
showing of actual negligence.”34
As explained below, results-based duties often arise
from statutes and contracts.35 This Part will, in turn,
consider duties arising from statutes and contracts.

A. NEGLIGENCE PER SE
This note first considers statutes. As discussed
previously,36 in the United States, one needs a legal theory
to sue. Thus, the mere existence of a statute on point does
not grant the person the right to enforce it by litigation. The
existence of a statute may result in one of three effects: the
statute could itself provide a legal theory for a suit,37 which
could be expressly stated by the legislature or implied;38 it
O’Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E.R. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 387-89 (1949). The Safety
Appliance Act imposes a specific duty. See id.
30 E.g., id. at 390.
31 Brady v. Terminal R. Ass’n., 303 U.S. 10, 15 (1938) (emphasis added).
32 Doherty v. S.S. Kresge Co., 278 N.W. 437, 441 (Wis. 1938). The Pure
Food Act also imposes a results-based duty. See id.
33 Id.
34 Id. (emphasis added).
35 On the other hand, the general duty of care and associated duties are
often general instead of specific.
36 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text (discussing the
Safety Appliance Act and Pure Food Act).
38 See generally Stabile, supra note 24. This includes utilizing an existing
cause of action instead of creating a new one. For example, the legislature
could allow for a tort cause of action. This would make the duty a “tort
duty,” which I shall use as shorthand for “duty for which a tort cause of
action exists.” In this note, we will be concerned exclusively with the
negligence cause of action. Therefore, a tort duty is a duty which
29
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could not provide a legal theory but be used by the courts to
infer negligent breach of the general duty of care; or it could
not provide a legal theory but serve as evidence, and no more
than evidence, of negligence. We will be seeing the third
category in Part V. Here, the paper considers the second
category.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restatement
Second”) provides the common rule for when a statutory duty
has per se effect:
The court may adopt as the standard of
conduct of a reasonable man the requirements
of a legislative enactment or an administrative
regulation whose purpose is found to be
exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes
the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is
invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of
harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the
particular hazard from which the harm
results.39
Thus, the grant of per se effect to a statutory duty is
essentially a bench trial on the merits. 40 Of course, that this
is the standard rule does not mean that it is the uniform

negligence recognizes. Such thinking might be odd to the reader, who
might find it strange that after identifying a cause of action in a context
in which it seems to apply, one should nonetheless ask whether the cause
of action includes the duty. This is probably exacerbated, and might even
be caused, by the fact that many causes of action do not float over various
duties. Regardless, it might help to analogize it to the element of actual
harm. We are much more used to asking whether a given cause of action
is intended to account for a certain type of harm. E.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (battery); id. § 46 (intentional
infliction of emotional distress); id. § 281 (negligence).
39 Id. § 286.
40 Compare the elements and implicit assumptions of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 with the elements of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 281.
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rule.41 Still, it has been reaffirmed in the draft of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts (“Restatement Third”)42 and is
the “strong majority rule.”43
Negligence per se is an important doctrine44 and has
many rationales: comity between the judiciary and the
legislature,45 the superiority of the legislature’s
determination of reasonableness to that of a jury, the
avoidance of conflicting results by different juries on
recurrent questions, and observance of the implied will of the
legislature.46
I would like to emphasize that most courts interpret
negligence per se as the use of breach of a statutory duty to
determine negligent breach of the general duty of care, under
the interpretation that the statute is part of the
circumstances; it is not the derivation of a tort duty.47 This is
There have been divergences, sometimes with spectacular results. For
example, one commentator has argued that negligence per se should not
exist at all. Barry L. Johnson, Why Negligence per se should be abandoned,
20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 247 (2017). Another has argued for a
categorical bar to all federal duties. Barbara Kritchevsky, Tort Law is
State Law: Why Courts should distinguish State and Federal Law in
Negligence-per-se Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 71 (2010).
42 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 (AM. LAW
INST. 2010) (“An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a
statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s
conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the
statute is designed to protect.”).
43 Id. § 14 cmt. c.
44 Id. § 14 cmt. d.
45 The comity rationale might appear slightly odd, given that the
legislature is the supreme lawmaker and that, accordingly, the judiciary
and the legislature are not on equal footing in making laws. Perhaps this
might best be interpreted as legal realism. See generally Michael Steven
Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915
(2005).
46 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 cmt. c. The
idea behind observance of the implied will of the legislature is thus: since
negligence per se has existed for decades, the legislature knows that the
judiciary could use its pronouncements to determine tort duties; where it
desires a private cause of action, it may establish one; where it does not
desire the judiciary to use it to determine negligence, it may say so; thus,
where it does not do either, it is knowingly leaving the responsibility to
the judiciary. Id.
47 For example, Arizona currently is an exception, because it does not have
a general duty of care but uses negligence per se. Quiroz v. Alcoa Inc., 416
P.3d 824 (Ariz. 2018). Thus, it interprets negligence per se as implying a
tort duty (the court speaks of public policy “giving rise” to duty). Id. Since
41
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the approach of the Restatement Third.48 In this case, the
negligence duty is conduct-based. Once negligent breaches of
general duties are covered in Part V, the breach question
here can be easily understood. This note adopts the
interpretation that negligence per se is concerned with
breach and not duty.49
The rest of this section shows that when a statutory
duty is given per se effect, it can be breached strictly,
intentionally, or negligently, although in the case of strict
liability, a court must ensure to grant the duty such
significance. As an example of strict breach of a duty giving
rise to negligence per se, consider MacDonald v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985). There,
the plaintiff suffered a stroke due to the use of contraceptive
pills and brought a products liability action against the
defendant company.50 The theory was inadequate warning of
the dangers.51 Ordinarily, manufacturers are under a duty to
inform consumers of the dangers of their products.52
However, in the case of pharmaceuticals, this duty is
weakened by the “learned intermediary” doctrine, which
provides that pharmaceutical companies discharge their
duty by informing the doctors, without informing the
patients directly.53 Relying on a Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) regulation to the contrary, as well as
various other reasons, the court held that the learned
intermediary doctrine did not apply to contraceptive pills,
and that pharmaceutical companies manufacturing
the court is considering public policy, the cause of action is not in the law
itself, expressly or impliedly. This is negligence per se. Id. at 565–66.
48 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 14 cmt. i and
note.
49 While there are reasons to interpret negligence per se as creating tort
duties, this note adopts the alternative approach since it is more in line
with court opinions. Moreover, (1) negligence per se is negligence per se,
not duty per se; (2) the questions courts ask to determine whether
negligence per se applies make more sense as breach questions rather than
duty questions; (3) because “intentional breach of duty” is not a legal
theory for suit, under the duty approach one obtains the systematic oddity
of granting remedies for negligence but not for the more egregious
intentional violations.
50 MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 66 (Mass.
1985).
51 Id. at 67.
52 Id. at 68.
53 Id. at 68-69.
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contraceptives had a duty, given per se effect and which
differed slightly from the regulation, “to provide to the
consumer written warnings conveying reasonable notice of
the nature, gravity, and likelihood of known or knowable side
effects, and advising the consumer to seek a fuller
explanation from the prescribing physician or another doctor
of any such information of concern to the consumer.” 54 The
court then affirmed a jury’s determination of breach, even
though the company had complied with the FDA
requirements because a trier of fact could have concluded
that the warnings provided did not adequately apprise users
of the inherent risks.55 In other words, there was a breach
because the warning requirement was not strictly complied
with, as determined by the factfinder.56 This is strict liability.
Meanwhile, in Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d
213 (Miss. 1979), the court found negligence per se due to an
intentional breach of statutory duty. There, the plaintiffs
brought suit against the defendant for selling beer to
underage boys in violation of law.57 One boy was 15, three
were 14, and one was 13.58 On the evening in question, the
boys found vodka in the family car, bought orange juice from
the defendant, and drank the mix.59 One of the 14-year-old
boys then went back to the defendant’s store and bought a
six-pack of 14-oz. cans of beer.60 The operator asked the boy
if he was of age, but made no effort to verify his affirmation.61
The record showed that he looked no older than fourteen.62
The boys then drank the beer. At that point, one member of
the party was lost to the protection of his 17-year-old sister,
who prevented him from continuing with the group because
she knew they were drinking beer.63 The remaining four then
drove back to the market, where a different member of the
party from the previous customer went in and bought
another six-pack of beer without any questions being

Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70-72.
56 Id.
57 Munford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So. 2d 213, 215 (Miss. 1979).
58 Id. at 214.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 215.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id. Times, evidently, change.
54
55
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asked.64 The boys then drank the beer, and another went
back to the store and bought another six-pack of beer, again
with no questions as to his age asked. 65 They drank the beer
then continued to drive, having an accident that killed one of
the boys.66 The court found a violation of the statute
preventing the sale of alcohol to underage kids, valid for
purposes of a negligence action, even though the violation
was intentional.67
On the other hand, the court in McDermott v.
McKeown Transportation Co., 263 Ill. App. 325 (Ill. App. Ct.
1931) declined to find negligence per se, because the breach
of the underlying statute, which imposed a results-based
duty, was not negligent as to the statutory duty. There, the
plaintiff, a 20-year old woman, brought suit for violation of a
statute requiring that cars have a rear red light on at night.68
The plaintiff was in a car with two young men and they were
heading south to a party the night in question. 69 The night
was misty and rainy.70 The fog was so thick the young partygoers could hardly see, and the path south was like a tunnel
with a row of trees of heavy foliage on the west side and an
embankment holding railroad tracks on the east.71 The arc
lights on the street failed to penetrate the fog, 72 and the
windshield was so full of water it “all splashed up,” and the
passengers could not see through the windshield.73 The
young party, driving between 15 and 20 miles per hour in
these conditions, rear-ended a delivery truck that had just
finished its night’s work.74 The truck was traveling around
10 miles per hour.75 It had a new kerosene lamp that was in
good condition and that was lit when it had gotten dark two
hours before the accident.76 There was also evidence that it
was lit five minutes before the accident, just after the truck’s
Id.
Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 215-17.
68 McDermott v. McKeown Transp. Co., 263 Ill. App. 325, 326–28 (1931).
69 Id.at 326.
70 Id. at 327.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 327-28.
73 Id. at 327.
74 Id. at 328.
75 Id.
76 Id.
64
65
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last delivery, throwing a red light to the rear.77 The court
refused to attach strict liability to the statute.78 There was
no “absolute legal duty” to maintain a red light at the rear of
the car, and “the law [was] not so unreasonable that there
might not be circumstances which would relieve one from
liability in case the rear light suddenly went out.” 79 The court
concluded that even if the light were out at the time of the
accident, a jury could find that the defendant did not breach
a duty insofar as it had taken reasonable steps to achieve the
law’s dictate.80
The McDermott court quoted Toledo, Wabash &
Western Railway Co. v. Beggs, 85 Ill. 80 (1877), in which the
Illinois Supreme Court reversed a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff in a personal injury case for the breaking of a wheel
on the coach of a railroad train, because the wheel was
manufactured by one of the most skillful makers in the
United States, was of the kind usually employed in the
industry, and had been subject to and withstood the ordinary
tests, so that the defect was not discoverable through
reasonable care.81 In other words, the non-attainment of the
statute’s result was not foreseeable.
This requirement of negligence for breach of statutory
duty can be found in other cases.82 In Brotherton, the court
reversed a judgment for the plaintiffs in an action against
the defendants for having been negligent in ensuring that
their rear red light was working, as required by law.83 The
court found that the vehicle had been inspected at 4 p.m. on
the day of the accident and that the rear lights were shining
less than half an hour before the collision.84 The court noted
that “the electric bulb [of a vehicle] may at any time cease to
function, or the light for some other reason may suddenly
cease to shine, without any fault on the part of the person in
charge of the vehicle, and without his becoming aware of the
fact that the light has gone out.”85 The court reversed the
Id.
Id. at 329.
79 Id. at 328–29.
80 Id. at 329–31.
81 Id. at 329.
82 E.g., Floyd v. Johnson, 100 S.W.2d 975, 978 (Ark. 1937); Brotherton v.
Day & Night Fuel Co., 73 P.2d 788, 791 (Wash. 1937).
83 Brotherton, 73 P.2d at 789–90.
84 Id. at 794.
85 Id. (emphasis added).
77
78
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judgment as against the weight of the evidence, stating that
“it [was] difficult to understand upon what theory appellants
were held negligent,” and asking: “How should appellants
have known that the lights on the rear of the truck were not
shining?”86
This gives us the notion of a negligent breach of a
results-based duty: a results-based duty is breached
negligently if its breach was foreseeable. In other words, the
person subject to the duty has to take reasonable steps to
ensure that the result of the duty is attained. The idea is
incredibly simple: since the person is subject to a resultsbased duty, the task is to ensure that the duty is satisfied
without being subject to strict liability.87

B. DUTIES UNDER CONTRACT

As we have seen, in the case of statutory duties,
courts infer breach of the general duty of care without
converting the statutory duty into a tort duty.88 In the
context of contracts, courts, as we shall see, convert the
contractual duty into a tort duty. Moreover, whereas in
statutory duties there is a common rule governing the
analysis, no such uniformity exists in the contractual
setting.89
As an example, this note considers the rule suggested
by the Restatement Third. That rule is motivated by physical
harms and promissory estoppel:
An actor who undertakes to render services to
another and who knows or should know that
the services will reduce the risk of physical
harm to the other has a duty of reasonable
care to the other in conducting the
undertaking if:

Id.
Although the note does not consider recklessness, that breach of a
results-based duty simply demands greater foreseeability.
88 See supra Section IV.A.
89 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & E MOT. HARM § 42 cmts.
e & f and notes (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
86
87
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(a) the failure to exercise such care
increases the risk of harm beyond that which
existed without the undertaking, or
(b) the person to whom the services are
rendered or another relies on the actor’s
exercising
reasonable
care
in
the
undertaking.90

The dominant element appears to be the relationship
between the undertaking and the reduction of risk of
physical harm, which carries the undertaking into the ambit
of tort law. For example, if a person comes to install a water
heater, the undertaking is not governed by this section
because the installation of a new water heater is not
connected to the reduction of an existing risk of physical
harm.
The requirement of “reasonable care” implies that the
specific tort duty cannot be breached strictly.
The Restatement Third recognizes that the
distinction between (a) and (b) is unclear.91 Further, the
Restatement Third emphasizes that the rule, in speaking of
undertakings, is intended to cover promises. 92 This is some
version of promissory estoppel, but it is not promissory
estoppel itself.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides as to
promissory estoppel: “[a] promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise.”93
In the world of undertakings that one could
reasonably know to reduce the risk of physical harm to
others, it can be seen that any undertaking resulting in a
contractual duty through promissory estoppel will also result
in a tort duty through the rule above. On the other hand, the
existence of option (a) in the tort rule makes tort duties more
extensive than contractual duties. Yet in the world of
undertakings generally, the requirement that the
undertaking relate to the reduction of physical harm to
Id. § 42.
Id. § 42 cmt. f.
92 Id. § 42 cmt. e.
93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
90
91
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others makes contractual duties through promissory
estoppel more extensive than tort duties through the rule
above.
In terms of breaches, the same rule applies. There is
negligent breach of the results-based duty if the breach was
foreseeable. In Anderson v. Kroh, 301 N.W.2d 359 (N.D.
1980), the plaintiff brought suit against a landowner for
wrongful death and destruction of property.94 The plaintiff
had rented a mobile home from the owner, who lived in a
building north of the trailer.95 One day, the plaintiff realized
that the trailer was without hot water, so she sent her 12year-old daughter to inform the landowner of the problem.96
The landowner was a mechanic and self-trained in the
functioning of heaters,97 so he came to resolve the issue
himself. After he had relit the flame, he instructed the
plaintiff to keep the door to the water heater compartment
open because of dampness in the compartment.98 The flame
appeared to burn strangely, to the side of and down from the
water tank in a reddish-orange color.99 The landowner did
not check the flue. 100 In fact, he made no investigation,
including as to the cause of the flame’s initial
extinguishment, other than checking a faucet on the heater
for leakage.101 That night, the plaintiff went out with friends,
leaving her four children in the trailer.102 She returned to
find the trailer burning.103 Three of her children had escaped,
but one had remained in his room and perished in the fire.
104 Additionally, all the personal property in the trailer was
lost.105 At trial, evidence was introduced that the landowner,
who even had special knowledge, should have known that his
repair was inadequate. When relighting the flame, one
should always determine why the flame had been

Anderson v. Kroh, 301 N.W.2d 359, 360 (N.D. 1980).
Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 361, 363.
98 Id. at 360.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 361.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
94
95
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extinguished in the first place.106 Checking the flue is a
routine matter in this service call.107 There was evidence that
a blocked flue could cause a fire.108 One should also engage
in other routine tasks, such as checking the chimney.109 All
these, of course, show that because the landowner could have
foreseen that he was not fixing the heater properly, the court
concluded that the evidence supported a finding against the
defendant for negligence and reversed a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.110 Unlike foreseeability, the
court, as the above shows, did not engage in an explicit costbenefit analysis.
In Mixon v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 254 S.E.2d 864 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1979), the plaintiff sued the defendants for failing
to deliver an emergency message. The plaintiff’s husband
had informed his manager that his wife, the plaintiff, was
pregnant and that he would have to leave at a moment’s
notice to take her to the hospital.111 He worked loading food
and clearing planes serviced by his employer for Delta Air
Lines and had no access to a telephone. 112 His manager had
agreed to inform him if his wife called.113 This discussion had
occurred twice, and twice the manager agreed.114 A few
weeks later, the plaintiff, in labor, called the employer and
spoke with the timekeeper, who promised to give her
husband the message and relayed it to his manager.115 Thirty
minutes later, the plaintiff again called, asking whether the
message had been delivered, as she was in labor and her
husband, who was only ten minutes away, had not yet
arrived.116 The timekeeper again relayed the message, this
time to a supervisor.117 The plaintiff soon called a third time,
“crying and desperate,” and was told that her husband was
on the way home.118 In fact, he had not been relayed the
Id. at 361–62.
Id.
108 Id. at 361.
109 Id. at 362.
110 Id. at 362–63.
111 Mixon v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 254 S.E.2d 864, 864 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
112 Id. at 864–65.
113 Id. at 865.
114 Id. at 864–65.
115 Id. at 865.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
106
107
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message at all, even though he was working in the kitchen,
and could have been easily delivered a message both in
person and over the intercom.119 When the husband’s shift
ended and he was heading out, the timekeeper asked him
whether he had received the message.120 He returned home
to find that his wife had had to give birth to their child alone,
unassisted and unmedicated.121 The court concluded that
there was a duty arising from a promise,122 and explained:
“In order for a party to be liable as for negligence, . . . [i]t is
sufficient, if in ordinary prudence he might have foreseen
that some injury would result from his act or omission . . .
The most common test of negligence is whether the
consequences of the alleged wrongful act are reasonably to
be foreseen as injurious to others coming within the range of
such acts . . . .”123
In Slogowski v. Lyness, 927 P.2d 587 (Or. 1996), the
plaintiff’s father brought a negligence action against a
defendant company.124 The defendant had an easement
across certain real property to erect and maintain electrical
power lines, and it was alleged that the defendant “had
undertaken to inspect all trees along its right-of-way, and to
remove trees with hazardous defects.” 125 One day, while the
plaintiff’s wife was driving with the couple’s four children
along the property subject to the easement, a large fir tree
fell on the car, killing three of the children and injuring the
fourth.126 The plaintiff alleged that the tree was a hazardous
condition discoverable upon inspection, presenting a
foreseeable danger to passing cars.127 “The condition of the
tree, coupled with its position on the south side of the
roadway, presented a significant foreseeable danger of tree
failure and resulting collapse into the area of the roadway on
which drivers and passengers of vehicles, such as the
plaintiffs in this case, would be travelling.”128 The court
Id.
Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 865-66.
123 Id. at 865 (quoting Stuckey’s Carriage Inn v. Phillips, 178 S.E.2d 543,
549 (1970)).
124 Slogowski v. Lyness, 927 P.2d 587, 588 (Or. 1996).
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 588-89.
128 Id. at 589 (quoting the complaint).
119
120
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found that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to show
that the defendant had a tort duty based on an
undertaking.129 The plaintiff had also alleged, through the
discoverability of the hazardous condition and the failure to
remedy it, that the defendant was negligent.130 The court
reversed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the
defendant.131

C. SUMMARY

Duties can be results-based or conduct-based. Results-based
duties are breached negligently when a reasonable person
would have foreseen the non-attainment of the specific
result. In the tort setting, there is typically physical harm
associated with the duty. This note has considered two main
types of results-based duties, statutory and contractual, and
their relationship to the negligence cause of action. This note
has taken the general duty of care to require that a person
acts in such a way so as not to create unreasonable risks of
harm, all circumstances considered. This note has also taken
the negligence cause of action to include duties beyond the
general duty of care.132
Id. at 590.
Id.
131 Id. at 591.
132 There exists another viable interpretation. Under this interpretation,
the negligence cause of action is not a floating cause of action that runs
over various duties. Instead, it is limited to the general duty of care.
Breach of other duties related to the cause of action can then show, as
negligence per se does (albeit as a matter of law), breach of the general
duty of care. For example, in the contractual setting, the Restatement
Third’s requirements for the derivation of a tort duty from contract are
such that breach of the contractual duty would imply breach of the general
duty of care, especially given that the party under contract can often admit
inability to execute the duty, thereby saving the beneficiary from harm.
However, judicial opinions have not developed this interpretation, and this
note does not adopt it.
The rejection of this interpretation of the negligence cause of
action is critical in understanding modern negligence law. To be clear, the
alternative could well be preferable. If the cause of action were limited to
the general duty of care, one would no longer need to ask the question:
“What does it mean to be in negligent breach of a duty?” since there would
129
130
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V. NEGLIGENT BREACHES OF CONDUCT-BASED DUTIES
A. LITERATURE REVIEW
This Section considers the standard constructs used
in determining breach of conduct-based duties, focusing on
the general duty of care. Each construct is provided with one
or two examples that are used in the subsequent Section to
help clarify how all the constructs are accounted for by the
two-step procedure given in this note’s thesis. First, however,
this note reviews the common ground of the standard
constructs.

1. FORESEEABILITY
Part III explained that the crux of breach of resultsbased duties is foreseeability. Foreseeability is also a
construct used to determine breach of conduct-based
duties.133
no longer be a basis for that question. Instead, the analysis would be
limited to the general duty of care, the breach of which would be
determined as in Part V, infra. Correspondingly, one would never need
ask: “Was there an intentional breach of duty?” or “Was there a reckless
breach of duty?” In analyzing laws, one would only ask: “Was there a
breach of duty?” And in case of negligence per se, the extra requirement
imposed by courts on other duties to find negligence per se would be
precisely that: Extra requirements to convince the courts that the breach
of the other duties truly does show breach of the general duty of care.
Under this interpretation of the negligence cause of action, there would
only be four elements: breach, harm, actual cause, and proximate cause.
Nevertheless, this is not currently the law. Since the negligence
cause of action floats over duties, one is forced to ask the sweeping
question: “What does it mean to negligently breach a duty?” The issue of
this culpability use of mens rea is that, in line with modern criminal law,
duties are rife with elemental mens rea terms. The result is such awkward
questions as: “What does it mean to negligently breach a duty that
demands intent?” or “What does it mean to negligently do something
recklessly?” Two independent formalist systems (elemental definitions
and broad culpability definitions) would clash. They experience an
uncomfortable coexistence. The questions can be answered, but the
answers are clunky. The reader is forewarned.
133 W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and
Judicial Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 739, 744–47 (2005); D. E. Buckner, Annotation, Foreseeability as an
Element of Negligence and Proximate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942 § 2[c]
(Westlaw, last accessed Oct. 31, 2020).
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For example, in Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013), the plaintiffs brought suit against
the friend of a driver who injured them in an accident,
claiming negligence in texting the driver. The facts of the
case are simple. The driver and this defendant were in a nonexclusive relationship.134 They texted each other multiple
times a day.135 On the day of the accident, they had texted
each other 62 times.136 That day, while the driver was
returning from work,137 he was texting his friend.138 Between
the friends’ last text preceding the accident and the driver’s
911 call to help the injured, 17 seconds had elapsed. 139 The
court affirmed the dismissal of the charges against the
friend.140 “We hold that the sender of a text message can
potentially be liable if an accident is caused by texting, but
only if the sender knew or had special reason to know that
the recipient would view the text while driving and thus be
distracted.”141 In other words, harm is not foreseeable simply
because, in the abstract, the recipient is a driver, or even that
at the time the message was sent, the recipient is driving.
Particularized knowledge is needed for the foreseeability of
harm in this context.142 The court found that the plaintiffs
had failed to show that the driver’s friend knew he was
driving or, even if she did, that he would immediately view
her text.143
Returning to breach in general, the question at this
stage of a negligence analysis is whether some harm was
foreseeable to some person.144 It also bears emphasis that
foreseeability is not nugatory. Any harm has an infinitesimal
probability of occurring (otherwise, it would never have
occurred). That is not what is meant by foreseeability.145
Kubert v. Best, 75 A.3d 1214, 1219 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
Id.
136 Id.
137 Of course, the driver was also a defendant in the suit. Id. at 1218.
138 Id. at 1220.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1221.
141 Id. at 1219.
142 It might help in understanding this case to recognize the court’s being
knowledgeable about societal norms. Id. at 1223.
143 Id. at 1229.
144 Cardi, supra note 133, at 746-47; Buckner, supra note 133 § 2[c].
145 To “foresee” means to “see beforehand, have prescience of.” Foresee,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). As in psychology those who
134
135
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2. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Another important construct in determining a breach
in a negligence action is the use of a cost-benefit analysis.146
Phrased in misleading simplicity, the cost-benefit construct
states that conduct is negligent if the resulting
disadvantages would outweigh the conduct’s possible
advantages.147 The most famous theoretical formula of a costbenefit analysis was provided by Judge Learned Hand who,
in an attempt to clarify the concept, suggested a formula of
weighing B, the cost to the individual of a particular action,
against P, the probability of injury if the action is not taken,
and L, the cost of that injury.148 Thus, if B < PL, then the
actor’s conduct is negligent.149 In other words, the actor is
negligent in not having taken the precautionary conduct,
which would have cost less to him than the probabilistic
harm. A cost-benefit analysis should consider two snapshots:
one with negligent (inaction), and one without, to calculate
costs and benefits and engage in its absolute analysis. When
the error is inaction, one must typically specify some action
that was not done, which may require an exercise in
creativity.150

remember all, sad is the fate of the person, never reasonable, who foresees
everything that has a mere infinitesimal probability of occurring. That we
can foresee.
146 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (AM. LAW
INST. 2010).
147 Id. § 3 cmt. e.
148 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir.
1947). This inequality is inept in socialist states such as in Europe, since
it compares a private cost B with a public cost PL. Where the economic
assessments of the terms are precise, the formula fails. For example, if B
is simply measurable and equals $4,999 and PL is simply measurable and
equals $5,000, the imposition of liability is improper, even though the
formula unequivocally implies liability.
149 Id. at 173. Of course, PL is a sum over all potential injuries.
Furthermore, it is more proper to speak of P1L – P2L, where P1 is the
probability of injury before the action is taken, and P2 is the probability of
injury after the action is taken. This recognizes that the action need not
eliminate the probability of harm. It need merely reduce it.
150 One should not confuse the relationship to duty of the foreseeability
and cost-benefit constructs. The foreseeability construct is linked to a
duty. The cost-benefit construct is not.
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In United States v. Carroll Towing Co., a barge,
carrying goods belonging to the United States, broke loose
from her moors, hitting a tanker and creating a hole in the
barge’s hull.151 The hole made the barge sink and destroy the
entire cargo of goods.152 The issue before Judge Learned
Hand dealt with the comparative liability of the barge owner
in failing to have a bargee or another attendant on board.153
Judge Learned Hand found, due to the surrounding
circumstances of the incident, that it was foreseeable that
the mooring work would not have been done with adequate
care, thus necessitating the presence of a bargee on board.154
Phrasing this in terms of the now-famous Learned Hand
formula, B would be the cost of labor involved in keeping an
attendant on board, P would be the probability of the
resulting circumstances occurring absent having an
attendant on board, and L is would be the damages that were
incurred from the unattended barge breaking loose from its
moors. Here, the court found there was a high probability of
the resulting consequences. When this foreseeability is
combined with the gravity of the damages incurred, then
B<PL. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s conduct was ultimately
deemed to be negligent.
This note defines cost-benefit analysis expansively.
Neither the costs nor the benefits need to be economic or even
quantifiable. As such, the existence of a “formula” can be
misleading. Judge Learned Hand himself was clear that the
formula was merely illustrative.155 For example, suppose a
neighbor is tasked with picking up a young child from an
after-school activity held outside the school. The neighbor
delays in picking up the child, who suffers extreme fear of
being left alone in an unfamiliar location. If the neighbor is
sued for negligence, the jury, in addressing the cost-benefit
construct, must consider the harm the neighbor would have
suffered had he been on time, the foreseeability of the child’s
suffering from the delay, and the harm the child suffered as
a result. All of which are, presumably, not economic. Or
consider a woman eagerly awaiting her partner’s arrival so
that the two could go to a new chocolate shop a few blocks
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 170-71.
Id. at 171.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 173-74.
155 Id. at 173.
151
152

Understanding the Negligence Question

153

away. Her partner, however, feeling lethargic after having
lunch, decides to lie down for a while and, naturally, falls
asleep. The heroine, disappointed, accuses her partner of
negligent breach of fiduciary duty, specifically the duties to
pander, indulge, and assure their partner’s happiness. The
cost-benefit analysis of this social situation is neither
economic nor quantifiable.156

3. NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO CURE
Notice and opportunity to cure are constructs used to
prove landowner negligence in slip and fall cases. 157 One
must show that the defendant-landowner had notice of the
hazardous condition which resulted in the slip and that the
notice sufficiently provided an opportunity to cure the
hazardous condition.158 The plaintiff can prove notice by
showing that the defendant had actual notice of the
hazardous condition or that the defendant had constructive
notice.159 For example, the plaintiff can show the defendant
previously received specific complaints about the condition,
approved work orders to fix it, or created the condition
himself.160 The plaintiff can also prove that a defendant had
constructive notice of the hazardous condition.161 A number
of factors guide the analysis of constructive notice, such as
the length of time a foreign substance has been on a
premises, the nature of such substance, the substance’s
location within the premises, the substance’s proximity to
employees, and the number of entrants to the premises. 162
One exception to the requirement of notice is the
“mode of operations” rule, which states that notice of
hazardous conditions is imputed and active surveillance
demanded where the mode of operation of the business
creates a risk of recurrent hazards.163 The Connecticut
As this note has attempted to emphasize, negligence is a self-standing
concept, a type of breach. Thus, negligent breach of duty is negligent
breach of duty, be the duty legally cognizable or not.
157 2 NORMAN J. LANDAU & EDWARD C. MARTIN, PREMISES LIABILITY—LAW
AND PRACTICE § 8A.03, Lexis (database updated 2020).
158 Id. § 8A.03.
159 See generally id. § 8A.03[1].
160 Id.
161 See generally id. § 8A.03[2].
162 Id.
163 See id. § 8A.03[3][f].
156
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Supreme Court addressed this rule in Kelly v. Stop & Shop,
Inc., 918 A.2d 249 (Conn. 2007). There, the plaintiff visited
the defendant's supermarket to purchase groceries and to
make a salad.164 The supermarket offered a self-service salad
bar, where the plaintiff prepared her salad.165 The bar had
no railings, lacked adequate space to accommodate trays,
and was surrounded on both sides by a narrow “floor
runner.”166 The surrounding floor was made of tile or
linoleum.167 When the plaintiff left the area covered by the
floor runner to pick up a lid, she slipped and fell.168 While she
was wiping her shoes during her recovery at the
supermarket, she observed “a wet, slimy piece of green
lettuce” on the side of her shoe. 169 The plaintiff alleged that
the lettuce had caused her to fall. The question was whether
the supermarket was liable for the injuries alleged.170
The court explained that the mode of operations rule
arose from the proliferation of self-service retail stores that,
allowing customers to pick up their items and move them
around the store, increased the risk of drops and spillage.171
This risk is exacerbated by retail marketing techniques
which attract customers’ attention towards the shelves and,
consequently, away from the floors.172 The mode of operation
rule implicates the store’s actions and, in a slip and fall case,
imputes notice. Where there are continuous, foreseeable
dangerous conditions, the plaintiff need not prove the
defendant had either constructive or actual notice.173 The use
of self-service and marketing techniques are financially
favorable for the operation of a store but also increase the
risks of injuries on the premises. 174 These costs become part
of a business’s calculus of doing business.175 The court
concluded its analysis by observing that the mode of

Kelly v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 918 A.2d 249, 252 (Conn. 2007).
Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 252-53.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 256.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 259.
174 Id. at 258, 260.
175 Id. at 261.
164
165
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operation rule comports best with the standard of reasonable
care.176
The court held that a plaintiff established a prima
facie case of negligence by showing that the defendant
business’s mode of operations carried a foreseeable risk of
injury that proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.177

4. PRIVATE STANDARDS
A related issue in entity liability concerns the use of
an entity’s standards in establishing negligence. That is, to
what extent does an entity’s violation of its standards
provide proof of the entity’s negligence?
The Restatement Third suggests that the
admissibility of the entity’s standards should be governed by
all the circumstances of the case, such as the extent of the
plaintiff’s reliance on those standards, the extent to which
they demonstrate foreseeability, and the extent to which
those standards provide for discretionary extra care.178 If
admitted, the standards do not create a tort duty; they are
merely relevant in establishing whether the entity has
exercised reasonable care.179
For example, in Current v. Columbia Gas of Kentucky,
Inc., 383 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1964), plaintiff homeowners
brought suit against a defendant gas company.180 The
plaintiffs, a husband, wife, and their five minor children,
moved into a new home in Winchester on October 28, 1960.181
The house contained a 65,000 BTU space heater in the living
room.182 It was disputed whether this heater was vented.183
Id. at 262.
Id. at 263.
178 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 13 cmt. f (AM.
LAW INST. 2010). It appears the Restatement is engaging in what recalls a
Rule 403 balancing analysis. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
179 Id.
180 Current v. Columbia Gas of Kentucky, Inc., 383 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Ky.
1964).
181 Id.
182 Id. Very roughly speaking, this would have power sufficient to heat
around 1,900 square feet, or 180 square meters. E.g., Herb Kirchhoff, How
Much Space does a 1500 Watt Heater Heat Up?, SFGATE (last updated Dec.
17, 2018), available at https://homeguides.sfgate.com/much-space-1500watt-heater-heat-up-87133.html.
183 Id. at 141.
176
177
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Since the house had been vacant, the gas had been cut off
before the plaintiffs’ occupation and had to be reinstated.184
The defendant inspected the premises and reinstated gas
services, lighting the pilot light on the space heater.185 An
employee of the business testified that according to private
standards and his knowledge, he ensured that the heater
was burning normally and was not dirty.186 Having noted the
heater’s power, the employee also ensured it was vented.187
During a night of heavy rain, the plaintiffs fell ill and
called the doctor who arrived to find them vomiting, and
concluded that they had suffered a mild gastric upset. 188 The
next day, when the father did not report to work, a concerned
coworker, apprehensive, visited the plaintiffs’ house.189 She
knocked on the door and heard moans coming from within
the house.190 She entered and found the mother on the floor
in the living room, the children on two couches, and the
father “half on the bed,” unconscious.191 There was soot or
other settlement around the mouth and nostrils of at least
three of the family members.192 They had apparently been
poisoned by leaking carbon monoxide gas from the
improperly vented heater.193
The issue before the court, for purposes of this note,
pertained to the admissibility of the private standards for
inspecting and venting heaters to which the defendant’s
employee attested.194 The court reasoned that a jury could
not assess the standard of conduct for a specialized business
without direct information about the standards of conduct of
such business.195 Here, the defendant’s employees knew the
rules and testified that they constituted safe practice.196 The
Id. at 140.
Id. at 140-41.
186 Id. at 141.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 141-42.
194 Id. at 142.
195 Id. at 143 (“It may be questioned that a jury of laymen can intelligibly
gauge the degree of care usually exercised by an ordinarily prudent man
when that mythical actor is engaged in conduct utterly beyond the ken of
the juror.”)
196 Id.
184
185
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rules were clearly in place for safety.197 There was no
evidence that they exceeded ordinary standards of care.198
The court admitted the evidence.199
In contrast, the New York high court reached a
different result in Rivera v. New York City Transit Authority,
569 N.E.2d 432 (N.Y. 1991). Evidence, in that case,
suggested that the plaintiff’s husband spent ten to fifteen
seconds at the edge of a platform in a train station, entirely
stable, looking into the tunnel at an arriving train.200 He
then began acting erratically, staggering as though
intoxicated, fell onto the tracks, and was killed by the
oncoming train.201 The plaintiff sued, alleging that the train
operator was negligent in speeding into the station.202 As
concerned the admissibility of private standards in the case,
the court was curt: “[W]e note that the trial court should not
have admitted into evidence the defendant's entire internal
rule book and manual containing irrelevant material which
was not relied upon by the parties’ experts or which imposed
a higher standard of proof on the defendant than that
imposed by law.”203 Instead, the court reversed a judgment
for the plaintiff and remanded for a proper determination of
foreseeability and the reasonableness of the driver’s actions
under the circumstances.204

5. CUSTOM
Another question concerning negligence arises with
the violation of customs. Customs are defined as standards
set by the community in question.205 Departure from custom
is often strong evidence of negligence.206 Such custom shows
that further precautions were available to the actor, that
they were feasible, and that the actor should have been

Id.
Id.
199 Id.
200 Rivera v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 569 N.E.2d 432, 433 (N.Y. 1991).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 435 (citation omitted).
204 Id. at 434-36.
205 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 13 (AM. LAW
INST. 2010).
206 E.g., id. § 13(b) & cmt. c.
197
198
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aware of them.207 The actor can counter this by attempting
to question the intelligence of the custom, by showing
adoption of other risk-reducing measures that were at least
as good as the custom in question, or that the methods of
operation belied the applicability of such custom.208 On the
other hand, compliance with custom is merely evidence
offered to support that the actor was not negligent.209
A classic opinion discussing custom is that of Judge
Learned Hand in The T.J. Hooper.210 There, two barges
carrying cargoes of coal were being transported by two tugs,
the “Hooper” and the “Montrose,” when they were hit by wind
coming from the east and sank far at sea.211 Plaintiffs
presented evidence that the weather bureau at Arlington
cast two predictions daily, and that had the tugs received the
Arlington reports, they would have put in at the Delaware
Breakwater on Cape Henlopen instead of weathering the
unknown storm.212 They did not receive the report because
the receiving sets on board, which belonged privately to the
seamen and not the business, were not in working order.213
The tugs’ business practices evinced that custom did not
demand there be receiving sets on board.214 However, Judge
Learned Hand rejected the suggestion that this custom
precluded a finding of comparative fault.215 He reasoned that
reliably maintained receiving sets cost little and afforded
great protection.216 As to theory, Judge Hand stated:
[I]n most cases reasonable prudence is in fact
common prudence; but strictly it is never its
measure; a whole calling may have unduly
lagged in the adoption of new and available
devices. It may never set its own tests,
however persuasive be its usages. Courts must
in the end say what is required; there are
Id. § 13 cmt. b.
Id. § 13 cmt. c.
209 E.g., id. § 13(a).
210 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
211 Id. at 737.
212 Id. at 739.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 739-40.
215 Id. at 740. In the case, all the vessels had been deemed unseaworthy.
Id. at 737.
216 Id. at 739.
207
208
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precautions so imperative that even their
universal disregard will not excuse their
omission.217
This reasoning echoes Holmes’s famous statement: “What
usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done,
but what ought to be done is set by a standard of reasonable
prudence, whether it is usually complied with or not.”218

6. STATUTES
Part III of this note states that some statutes may
serve as evidence, but no more than evidence, of negligence.
This situation is analogous to the treatment of evidence of
custom by the courts as just discussed, and more need not be
said.219
Section 16(b) of the Restatement Third asserts that
failing to adopt a precaution cannot be used to find
negligence if one taking that precaution would violate a
statute.220 This rule is difficult to understand. Even the
criminal law recognizes that statutes—criminal statutes—
can be broken for the greater good.221 Perhaps the way to
reconcile § 16(b) of the Restatement and § 3.02 of the Model
Penal Code is to recognize a general disinclination to find
liability.222

7. OPEN AND OBVIOUS DANGERS

Id. at 740.
Texas & P.R. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
219 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 16 (AM. LAW
INST. 2010). Furthermore, nothing precludes this application of statutes to
negligence even when the other applications of statutes in Part III.A are
valid. That said, when a statute has already been given per se effect, its
use as here would be rather blasé.
This is the default rule. See id. § 16 cmt. a. In other words, if a statute
states that noncompliance cannot be used to establish tort liability, or that
compliance precludes tort liability, then legislative intent dominates if
constitutional.
220 Id. § 16(b).
221 This is the necessity defense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 2007).
222 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM §
16(b), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02.
217
218
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The doctrine of open and obvious dangers historically
functioned to insulate landowners from liability for injuries
caused by dangers that were open and obvious.223 The idea is
that if a danger is so open and obvious to an entrant that
using reasonable care would have avoided the danger, then
the harm flowing from that danger should not be considered
foreseeable by the landowner.224 The Restatements Second
and Third have moved away from this position.225 These
latter two Restatements follow the same rule,226 except that
the Restatement Third does not limit it to invitees.227 The
rule given in the Restatement Second provides: “A possessor
of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused
to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger
is known or obvious to them unless the possessor should
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or
obviousness.”228 While courts have made much ado about this
development,229 the idea is simple: harm is not foreseeable
unless it is. In other words, the recognition is that harm is
sometimes foreseeable, even though the danger is open and
obvious.230
The Iowa Supreme Court tackled the open and
obvious doctrine in Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping
Center, Inc., 144 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa 1966). There, the plaintiff
slipped and fell on ice on her way from the shopping mall to
Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of the Rule Absolving a
Possessor of Land of Liability to Those Coming Thereon for Harm Caused
by Dangerous Physical Conditions of Which the Injured Party Knew and
Realized the Risk, 35 A.L.R.3d 230 § 2 (2020).
224 Id. § 3. The section also mentions contributory negligence and
assumption of risk; however, those are affirmative defenses and do not
bear on the landowner’s negligence.
225 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A (AM. LAW INST. 1965);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51 cmt. k (AM. LAW
INST. 2010).
226 Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A, with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51 cmt. k.
227 The Restatement Third has moved away from the traditional specific
rules for landowner liability that focus on the status of the entrant and the
type of harm, preferring instead the general duty of care formulation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51 cmt. a. There
appears to be a modern trend in fact in this direction. See Schopler, supra
note 223 § 2.
228 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1).
229 See, e.g., Schopler, supra note 227 § 2.
230 The Restatement Third calls this “residual risk.” R ESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 51 cmt. k.
223
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her car in the mall’s parking lot.231 Snow fell on March 15th,
16th, 17th, and 20th of 1960.232 The shopping center cleared
snow from the parking lot and sidewalks but had piled snow
from the sidewalk onto one particular patch of the grounds
and parking lot.233 During the two days immediately
preceding the plaintiff’s injury on March 22, 1960, the snow
pile had become rough and jagged, converting into slick
ice.234
In moving away from the traditional doctrine barring
defendant liability, the court expressed the modern
sentiment and evoked the original general duty of care:
Defects in premises which are in no sense
hidden and could only be classified objectively
as open and obvious may be of such nature
that the possessor should know the invitee
would not anticipate or guard against them in
using the premises within the scope of the
invitation. To arbitrarily deny liability for
open or obvious defects and apply liability only
for hidden defects, traps or pitfalls is to adopt
a rigid rule based on objective classification in
place of the concept of the care of a reasonable
and prudent man under the particular
circumstances.
The possessor of real estate is under a duty to
use reasonable care to keep his premises safe
for use by invitees. Failure to do so constitutes
negligence.235
The court explicitly recognized the shift from the
Restatement (First) of Torts, which had adopted the
traditional view, to the Restatement (Second), which rejected
the categorical bar.236
Finding it possible that the plaintiff had not
discovered or appreciated the risks because of potentially bad
Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Ctr., Inc., 144 N.W.2d 870, 873
(Iowa 1966).
232 Id. at 872.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 874.
236 Id. at 873-75.
231
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lighting and an obstructed view while pushing a shopping
cart,237 the court concluded that the facts presented a triable
case.238

8. RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Res ipsa loquitur is one of the most beautiful and
inventive notions in the law. It is a means of determining
from results (1) the existence of an act that (2) constitutes
negligent breach of duty.239 So bizarre was the result, says
res ipsa, that it must have been caused by one’s negligence.240
The traditional formulation of the doctrine, which operates
against a background of harm by some cause, asks whether
the instrumentality of the harm was in the exclusive control
of the defendant and whether the accident is of a type that
does not occur in the absence of negligence.241 The first
element guarantees that the defendant is the one responsible
for the mystical action, and the second element guarantees
that the mystical action was negligent. But it is precisely this
second element that carries res ipsa loquitur outside the
scope of this note, for the doctrine does not try to determine
whether a given action was negligent, which is this note’s
purpose. Instead, it utilizes our preexisting notions of
negligent actions. The element is generally found in other
formulations of the doctrine as well.242 Thus, while res ipsa
loquitur arises in the context of breach, it is not a construct

When discussing shoppers driving a cart, the court quoted: “Where a
grocery shopper must cross a supermarket parking lot heavily laden with
goods purchased in order to board his automobile it is of little help to him
to be aware of the presence of ice along the way. Under these
circumstances the likelihood of injury is not lessened by his knowledge and
the degree of care which he exercises. Many cases recognize this.” Id. at
876 (quoting King Soopers, Inc. v. Mitchell, 342 P.2d 1006, 1009 (Colo.
1959)).
238 Id. at 875-76.
239 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 b
(AM. LAW INST. 2010).
240 Admittedly, this sounds like finding breach by saying asa nisi masa.
241 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 17 cmt. b.
242 E.g., id. § 17; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (AM. LAW INST.
1965).
237
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like the preceding constructs of this section for finding it, and
there is no more to say on the matter.243

B. ANALYSIS
Conclusion: A conduct-based duty is breached if a
reasonable person would have foreseen harm244 and, in that
case, a cost-benefit analysis also weighed against the actor.
Proof245: This note “reduces” the determination of
breach in negligence cases to the first two constructs
discussed in Part V.A. The key is that the other factors are
contained in this two-step analysis. They are, in essence,
merely elaborations in particular contexts. To prove this, the
note shall show that an action that is negligent in this
general two-step analysis is also negligent in the context of
each of the other constructs, and vice versa.
There are other important concepts in breach that are unrelated to this
note. For example, one of the important, though not necessarily sensible,
rules in negligence is that a person with above-average knowledge and
skills is legally obligated to utilize them, regardless of whether in a field
that demands such specialized knowledge, where the rule would have been
extraneous. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 12.
This changes the applicable standard of care, which is ordinarily that
exercised by the objectively reasonable person, but does not otherwise
alter the method used to determine breach, such as is explained in this
note (in other words, for results-based duties, the question becomes
whether a reasonable person with the actor’s knowledge and skills would
have foreseen the non-occurrence of the duty’s result).
244 More generally, a conduct-based duty is breached if a reasonable person
would have foreseen the non-occurrence of the underlying result, and a
cost-benefit analysis weighed against the actor. In the negligence context
with which we are concerned, this is the occurrence of physical harm. The
recognition in this rule is that duties are assigned in order to achieve
certain results. Thus, consider the caretaker of children from Section II.
Suppose the caretaker had taken an action, or failed to take an action, that
ultimately made the child unhappy, and that the parents had alleged
negligent breach of duty. If the caretaker were under the results-based
duty that outright demanded the result, the question becomes whether a
reasonable person would have foreseen that the caretaker’s action or
inaction would have made the child unhappy. If the caretaker were under
the conduct-based duty, then presuming foreseeability weighed against
the caretaker, one would also have to ask whether a cost-benefit analysis
weighed against the caretaker as well. Under no circumstance can the
caretaker be held negligent as to a duty under a strict liability theory
applied to that duty. That would be a contradiction of terms.
245 The proof is uninteresting. The reader may find more informative the
examples at the end of each of the first three constructs that follow their
technical proofs.
243
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1. Notice and opportunity to cure: Notice and
opportunity to cure applies in slip and fall cases. Suppose a
landowner had notice of a defect and the opportunity to cure
it. Since the landowner had (1) notice of (2) a defect, then the
landowner could foresee harm. Since the landowner had an
opportunity to cure, then a cost-benefit analysis weighed in
favor of removing the defect. This is partly because
“opportunity to cure” means not so much that the defect is
curable, but that it could reasonably have been cured, and
partly because the defects in these cases can ordinarily easily
be cured, merely a cause of slips, so that a cost-benefit
analysis necessarily weighs in favor of the cure.
Now suppose a landowner could foresee harm from
some defect and that a cost-benefit analysis weighed in favor
of curing the defect. Since the landowner could foresee harm
from the defect then the landowner presumably had notice of
the defect. This notice could be actual or constructive.
Furthermore, since a cost-benefit analysis weighed in favor
of curing the defect, then the defect was not only curable (for
the cost of achieving the impossible, being infinite, would
necessarily outweigh any benefit), but reasonably curable.
For example, consider the case of the dangerous salad
bar, Kelly v. Stop & Shop.246 Since the particular danger, the
slimy lettuce on the ground, resulted from the store’s mode
of operations, the store had actual or constructive notice of
danger. This is the legal facilitation of the mode of operations
rule.247 Since the store knew its own procedures, having
Kelly v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 918 A.2d 249 (Conn. 2007). This case was
discussed in Part V.A.3.
247 The mode of operations rule is necessary, because of the additional
requirement in the law that a landowner know not (only) the condition
that creates the danger, but the direct danger that results in harm (or,
equivalently, that the landowner foresee harm from the particular danger
that results in harm, and not the condition that creates the danger).
Theoretically, this requirement reduces the standard of care from that of
the reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances. The
substantive error of this requirement is easily seen. Suppose a landowner
has a machine that, at fast but unknown rates, spews globs of oil in
random directions. Without the mode of operations rule, the landowner
would not be liable for any injury from a fall, unless the landowner knew
of the particular glob of oil on the particular patch of ground where the
injury occurred. This is clear error. The mode of operations rule overrides
this requirement. The machine is itself the danger, and one asks whether
there is opportunity to cure that danger by reducing its risk.
246
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created them itself, then it could also foresee harm resulting
from the unattended salad bar. Moreover, the problem could
be resolved by regular surveillance. This is a cost-effective
approach since the costs of medical injuries resulting from
falls are high. By extension, the store had the opportunity to
make safe the danger.
2. Private standards: Private standards concern an
entity’s own rules for its operations.248 Suppose an entity’s
private standards imply that it was negligent in a given
affair. Since the entity has adopted a precautionary
standard, then it could foresee some harm the standard was
meant to obviate. Furthermore, since it has adopted the
standard, then a cost-benefit analysis weighed in favor of the
safety measure. Recall that private standards would not
have been admissible (hence suggested negligence) unless
the factors of the extent of foreseeability of harm and
discretionary extra care weighed in favor of admissibility.
Now suppose that a company was negligent because
it could foresee harm, and a cost-benefit analysis weighed in
favor of dealing with the danger. Then, either it has broken
its private standards, or it has not. If it has broken its private
standards that would have accounted for the harm, then they
suggest negligence.249 If it has not, then the private
standards themselves are evidence of negligence for not
having accounted for a danger that was foreseeable and costeffectively managed.
For example, consider the case of the soot-poisoned
family, Current v. Columbia Gas of Kentucky.250 There, a
company had breached its private standards regarding the
lighting of a space heater. One of the reasons the standards
were admissible was their clear purpose of ensuring safety.
This shows foreseeability. Another reason the standards
were admissible was that they did not exceed ordinary
standards of care. This means they were cost-effective.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 13 cmt. f (AM.
LAW INST. 2010).
249 The proof can account for the admissibility factors by splitting itself up
into cases. However, that complication is unilluminating.
250 Current v. Columbia Gas of Ky., Inc., 383 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1964). This
case was discussed in Part V.A.4.
248

166

9 LMU LAW REVIEW 1 (2021)

3. Custom: Custom concerns rules imposed upon an
entity by the group to which the entity belongs.251 Suppose
custom weighed in favor of finding negligence. The failure of
an entity to question the custom will result in favor of finding
negligence.252 The existence of a custom means that harm
was foreseeable, and the failure to question means, for legal
purposes, that the expectation created by an entire group
having a precautionary custom that the cost-benefit analysis
weighs in favor of the precaution stands.
Now suppose an entity could foresee harm and a costbenefit analysis weighed in favor of accounting for the harm.
Then, the law removes custom as a construct in determining
negligence. Thus, that the construct, an artificial creation,
weighs in favor of finding negligence becomes vacuously true.
For example, consider The T.J. Hooper.253 There, two
barges sank because the tugs carrying them did not have
receiving sets on board. Since harm resulting from not
receiving news from the land was foreseeable, and since the
solution was highly cost-effective, Learned Hand refused to
consider that having functional receiving sets was not
required by custom.
4. Statutes: The context here is of a statute that does not
imply negligence per se and, from the flip side, has not been
prevented from use to determine negligence by the
legislature. Furthermore, because this section is concerned
with the general duty of care, the statute, one must assume,
is intended to reduce the risk of harm.254 The proof is similar
to that of custom.
Suppose the statute weighed in favor of negligence.
By construction, harm was foreseeable. Furthermore, a costbenefit analysis weighed in favor of the precautionary step.
This is because the legislature had presumably made the
correct cost-benefit determination. Unlike in the case of
custom, where deference is shown to the group, here
deference is shown to the legislature. The deference to
representatives of the people is, naturally, more powerful.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 13.
See supra Part V.A.5.
253 The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). This case was discussed in
Part V.A.5.
254 Unlike the preceding three constructs, the statute construct in fact
admits of the generalized analysis discussed supra, note 244.
251
252
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Now suppose that foreseeability and a cost-benefit
analysis weighed in favor of a precautionary measure. As
with custom, the law overrides statutes as a construct, so
that the construct, which is an artificial creation, vacuously
weighs in favor of finding negligence.
5. Open and obvious dangers: The proof here is simple
and is left to the reader’s enjoyment.255

C. INTERPRETATION
The two-step procedure of Part V.B streamlines
breach arguments in negligence cases. At the same time,
however, it contains a substantive statement on the nature
of negligence.
At the heart of every negligence case is an action (or
inaction) that could foreseeably result in harm, or more
generally, in the non-attainment of the purpose of a duty.
The red flag for an individual should be the foreseeability of
this harm. Yet, mere foreseeability cannot suffice. The extent
to which red flags are raised by our actions would impose
under that system excessive restrictions. If the benefits of
any given action to society exceed the costs, there is no
justification to its bar. Thus arises an additional element to
negligence, the substantive responsibility for which
transfers to the individual. One may engage in an action
despite the foreseeability of harm, provided that he assesses
and is convinced that its benefits exceed its costs. The state
has no purpose restricting the freedom of an individual to act
on the mere basis of foreseeability of harm.256 The
assessment of the propriety of his actions properly belongs to
the individual. If, however, society, through the voice of a
jury, deems that assessment to have been incorrect, the
individual must accept his negligence.257
The doctrine of open and obvious dangers is an affirmative defense. It
cannot imply negligence; it only bars negligence. Consequently, the only
question that should be asked is whether, in those negligence cases barred
by the open and obvious dangers doctrine, the two-step procedure also
implies the absence of negligence.
256 And calling it “negligence.”
257 This should not create the false impression that negligence is without
its oddities. For example, suppose an entity correctly assesses that it
255
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With results-based duties, the second element of
negligence does not, at first glance, exist. This is misleading.
The imposition of a results-based duty is based on an
assessment that its benefits exceed its costs; the second
element is automatically satisfied. For example, when one
contractually assumes a results-based duty, the parties are
implicitly agreeing to the high worth of the specific result,
and the law is obligated to recognize this imposition to give
content to contractual results-based duties. Absent the law’s
recognition, the specificity of the result in the contract
becomes legally vacant.258 Similarly, negligence per se grants
this same recognition to the legislative assessment inherent
in the enactment of a statute. It is no surprise, then, that the
“excuses” to statutory violations259 show that the violation
was not foreseeable,260 or that a cost-benefit analysis did not
weigh in favor of compliance.261
That said, there is no reason for the law to treat the
conclusion as foregone. It is possible instead to merely
prioritize the specificity of the duty in the cost-benefit
analysis, which is more consistent and analytically superior.
This note liberally uses “the negligence question” to
refer to the element of breach in negligence cases, despite
potential confusion with “the negligence cause of action,”
because “the negligence question” properly recognizes that
the heart and soul of negligence is the negligent breach.
Furthermore, while the note has not prioritized recklessness
would be more economically sensible for it to pay for deaths and medical
costs than adopt a security measure. Then, the entity will not pay at all,
for it cannot be deemed negligent. The entity will not have to take legal
responsibility for its actions. (Strict liability accounts for certain such
situations) Another example lies in the risk negligence poses of imposing
robotic uniformity on individuals and other entities. Indeed, tort law takes
as an explicit goal enforcing public standards of behavior. DAN B. DOBBS,
PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 4 (2d. ed. 2011).
There is a thin line between imposing standards of behavior and imposing
behavior, and duties as far-reaching as those imposed by negligence hold
great regulatory power. Furthermore, negligence interferes with market
forces. A good example is attorney malpractice suits based on general
negligence instead of breach of fiduciary duty.
258 This is true as principle. How contract law should treat unequal
bargaining power is a separate issue.
259 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 15 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
260 Id. § 15(b)-(d).
261 Id. § 15(b), (e).
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in its analysis, the elements of recklessness are the same as
those of negligence, the difference being one of extent. Thus,
recklessness demands that the foreseeability of harm be
greater, and the cost-benefit analysis be greatly skewed,
towards the costs.262
There is a great debate in the academic literature on
the proper role a cost-benefit analysis should play in
determinations of negligence. On one side of the spectrum
are economists, or law-and-economics adherents, who argue
that negligence is action with a poor balance of costs and
benefits, focusing particularly on economic aspects of the
costs and benefits.263 The pride of this approach lies in
reducing the entirety of negligence to a requirement of
economic efficiency.264 On the other side are those who
consider a cost-benefit analysis a construct to determine
negligence and no more, if they consider it a construct at
all.265 The most significant of those theories that reject the
economic model, the rights-based theories, seem united in
the emphasis they place on individual integrity.266 This note
agrees with both those who accept the economic analysis and
those who reject it.
In Buñuel’s That Obscure Object of Desire, the female
antagonist, to the bewilderment of viewers, is played by two

This conclusion accords with the approach of the Restatement. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 2.
263 E.g., Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. L EGAL STUD. 29
(1972); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 189-229 (6th
ed. 2011).
264 Posner, supra note 263, at 32-33.
265 E.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1999 (2007); Richard W. Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the “Hand
Formula”, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145 (2003); Heidi H. Hurd &
Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 333,
359-60 (2002).
266 See Zipursky, supra note 265, at 2029-30. In other words, they prioritize
the physical well-being and the property of individuals beyond a mere
economic approach. They might reject, for example, a $100 physical harm
to another for a $1,000 monetary benefit to the actor. There are other
theories. Zipursky, for example, runs full circle and argues for a civil
competence theory of negligence. Id. at 2033-40. This note agrees with
Zipursky that the civil competence theory provides a good statement of
negligence, but disagrees with him that it carries content, id. at 2039. In
particular, it is unclear how the content that he sees to it differs from the
model developed in this note.
262
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different women, Carole Bouquet267 and Ángela Molina,268
engendering much confusion especially at the beginning.269
This surrealist move, which might easily be interpreted
away as directorial fancy, is misleading. Despite the
complete opposition of the depictions and styles of the two
actresses, they are not playing two different characters.
There is a unique underlying character; Bouquet and Molina
merely demonstrate two different aspects of that character
consistently over the course of the movie. As such, the use of
two different actresses to play the same personage — a
brilliant move — is a surrealist red herring.
This note finds that, in a fashion similar to Buñuel’s
directorial sleight of hand, both the economic statement in
the fashion of cost-benefit analysis as typically developed
and its rejection merely describe different aspects of the
same underlying concept. The economic statement properly
recognizes that at the heart of negligence is an act (or
omission) that has been poorly assessed as to its costs and
benefits. Its rejection properly recognizes that mere
economic considerations are incomplete, even when extended
to matters like psychological well-being. The key lies in
adopting a proper assessment of costs and benefits, also
keeping in mind the first element of negligent breach:
foreseeability of breach of duty. It might do well to consider
negligence as a question of justice; explication is still needed.
This note’s chief contention is that the justice of negligence
lies in the system herein developed.
It does not appear that a justice-based model of
negligence differs from or adds to this note’s system,
whatever its relationship to the economic system as
commonly understood. For example, the rights-based
theorist’s search for respecting individual integrity is
interpreted as an additional cost in the cost-benefit analysis
to its violation. Zipursky points out that jury instructions
phrase breach in terms of the actions of the reasonable

Well-known as the Bond girl of For Your Eyes Only, starring opposite
Roger Moore. FOR YOUR EYES ONLY (Eon Productions 1981).
268 E.g., Pedro Almodovar’s LIVE FLESH (Goldwyn films, El Deseo S.A.
1997).
269 THAT OBSCURE OBJECT OF DESIRE (Greenwich Film Productions, Les
Films Galaxie & InCine 1977).
267
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person, not in the terms of this note’s system.270 But it is
precisely that standard this note attempts to explicate.
Zipursky complains that Learned Hand’s formula does not
account for inadvertence, such as a waiter spilling soup on a
patron.271 Perhaps; but to say the same of the cost-benefit
analysis of this note is to adopt an incomplete view. He
complains that the Hand formula does not account for
variable standards of care.272 The resolution there lies in the
correct understanding of costs and benefits. For example, a
common carrier has a duty to use the utmost care.273 This
means that injury to a passenger on public transportation is
to be weighed heavily. One could say the fact that a
passenger was injured on public transportation is in itself a
harm. Zipursky raises the same issue of special
relationships,274 which is resolved similarly. And he argues
that a cost-benefit analysis does not respect negligence’s
relationship to duty.275 This note, hopefully, has
demonstrated the relationship between duty and breach.
As another example, Wright argues that the law does
not require that one take affirmative actions to the benefit of
others, which presumably under a cost-benefit analysis
would often arise, such as where costs to the actor are low
and the benefits to the recipient high.276 This is tackled by
the first element of breach, foreseeability, and its
relationship to duty. There could be no negligence because
there is no duty. He also argues that rescuers who place
themselves at risk are not deemed contributorily negligent
even if a cost-benefit analysis weighed against their
rescue.277 Even assuming this to be true, it is irrelevant, as
it does not relate to a cost-benefit analysis to start with:
contributory negligence relates to apportionment of liability

Zipursky, supra note 265, at 2013-17. Zipursky, of course, is concerned
with cost-benefit analysis in his note.
271 Id. at 2017-18.
272 Id. at 2019-21.
273 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2100 (Deering 2020).
274 Zipursky, supra note 265, at 2021.
275 Id. at 2021-22.
276 Wright, supra note 269, at 147.
277 Id.
270
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and the technical right of an individual to recover for
damages.278
In the thickets lie complications. Keating has
complained that the economic model utilizes a “rationality”
standard rather than a “reasonableness” standard,279
deriving from it his issue that the economic model utilizes a
subjective, rather than objective, assessment of costs and
benefits.280 In other words, the jury’s assessment of costs and
benefits follows those of the individuals involved, rather than
that of the law.281 Abraham has complained that negligence
involves the setting of norms, finding it undesirable because
illegitimate and inconsistent.282 Entering the various
thickets will carry this note off course.
The tort structure developed in this note differs from
the criminal law. In criminal law, which is heavily concerned
with assessing moral wrongdoing, recklessness demands
consciousness of high unjustified risk, reading like an
attenuated form of intent rather than an aggravated form of
negligence.283 There are many other differences. Intent in
tort law holds a special place. It is a high form of culpability
that makes an individual liable for many injuries, including
those covered by other intentional torts.284 Tort law, put
Of course, contributory negligence is also defunct. The correct starting
point today for apportionment of liability is comparative fault.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 3 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2020).
279 In this conception, an individual is “rational” if he seeks his self-interest
and “reasonable” if he also considers others’ interests. See Gregory C.
Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 311-12 (1996). The distinction of these terms makes no sense
in the English lexicon, but makes more sense in European languages. The
reader may wonder why one would consider the economic model as using
a “rationality” standard. This relates to a particular interpretation of the
rationality standard, which this note shall not assess, for which the reader
is referred to Keating’s article.
280 Id. at 328-40.
281 Not so in the conception of this note. The law assigns whichever values
it wishes to the “costs” and “benefits” involved.
282 Kenneth S. Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence, 54 VAND. L. REV.
1187 (2001). Of course, the system of this article cannot be described as
“norm creation.”
283 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2007). But see
Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 Mass. 165, 177-78 (1884) (Holmes, J.)
(applying an objective standard to criminal recklessness).
284 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 33 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000)
278
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differently, recognizes transferred intent.285 The criminal
law’s doctrine of transferred intent is weak.286 Tort law, as
already seen, does not recognize transferred negligence. The
criminal law does.287 Tort law, with its emphasis on the
objective, is willing to impute knowledge.288 The criminal
law, with its emphasis on the subjective, is not.289 In short,
the facial similarities between tort law and criminal law
could well prove irksome instead of beneficial.
The criminal law also poses some of the more
challenging duty analyses, using as it does duties filled with
elemental mens rea terms. Suppose a criminal statute read:
“A person shall not fly a balloon with the intent of awakening
in viewers the desire to fly.” Assume a person violated this
duty, in other words, flew a balloon with the intent of
awakening in viewers the desire to fly. Is he also in negligent
breach of the duty? First, specify the act. Presumably, the act
is the flying of a balloon with a particular intent. Could the
person foresee flying a balloon with that intent? The answer
immediately appears to be “yes.” However, there is a
complication, for he must know of the intent to awaken the
desire to fly, not merely have the intent. This may or may not
exist, although with the standard of an objective person may
be imputed. Did a cost-benefit analysis weigh against the
act? Perhaps. Perhaps the criminalization of the act implies
a legislative determination that the desire to fly is not a
legally cognizable benefit, so the act, being harmful as a
breach of a criminal statute, is automatically negligent.
Regardless, formally, the question must still be posed.
Therein lies the difference between a mere breach and a
negligent breach of this duty.290

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 16, 870 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). For
example, a person who intends to assault and causes a battery will be
guilty of battery.
286 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2).
287 E.g., id. § 2.03(3).
288 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12.
289 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b).
290 To relieve the reader, it may be worth emphasizing that when a statute
contains elemental mens rea terms, it generally does not also require broad
culpability in its breach. The point here is that precision in language is
key. “Was the breach negligent?” and “Was the person negligent as to the
viewers’ desire to fly?” are two entirely different questions. The criminal
law can be quite careless about the difference.
285
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D. PROXIMATE CAUSE
To further clarify its system, this note considers the
relationship of the system to proximate cause. What follows
are two approaches to proximate causation.291

1. THE FORESEEABILITY TEST
Preliminarily, it is worth noting that the nature of the
foreseeability test is unclear. Indeed, despite elaborated
claims of the superiority of the risk test,292 the Restatement
ultimately asserts that the foreseeability test is “congruent”
with the risk test.293 This note interprets the two tests
differently.
The definition of the foreseeability test is relatively
uniform: an individual is liable for harm caused only if the
harm is of the general kind foreseen by his conduct.294 This
There is a third approach that the Restatement calls the “direct
consequences” approach. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT.
HARM § 29 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2000). It appears the criminal law uses
this approach. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(c)-(g) (6th ed.
2017). This note agrees with the Restatement that the “direct
consequences” test is vague and amorphous, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. e, and finds it devoid of content.
Unlike proximate causation in this note, which operates in a negligence
background and has a clear conceptual base, the criminal law proximate
causation deals generally with causes and consequences and lacks such a
base, functioning instead as an umbrella term. See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 6.4(c)-(g). As such, the causation question in criminal law is more akin
to the philosophical question of causation, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 431 cmt. a, rather than the proximate cause question of
negligence, which, recognizing the extensive liability otherwise imposed
by negligence and its oddity in not requiring intent or subjective
knowledge, properly limits the negligent person’s responsibility of making
the other person whole to select cases, see, e.g., DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK,
supra note 257, § 199. Indeed, to a nontrivial extent, it appears that
proximate causation in the criminal law is a question of genuine fault,
whereas in tort law it is merely a question of whether to make somebody
pay for harm caused.
292 See supra Part V.D.2 (discussing the risk test).
293 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. e. But
see id. § 29 Reporters’ Note cmt. d (stating that the two tests are only “quite
compatible”).
294 E.g., DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 257, § 198. These
definitions also often ask whether the injured person belongs to the class
of persons put at risk by the conduct. Id. Since this note has taken
291
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definition, under its plain reading adopted here, raises three
points. First, which is shared by the risk test, the reason for
which harm is proximately caused by an action is intimately
linked to the reason for which the action was negligent. Both
tests, indeed proximate cause itself, are concerned with
whether the consequences of the negligent action match the
fears held of that negligent action.295 Second, the
foreseeability test is concerned with harms. “Harm” is a term
of art in negligence law.296 As such, the references to “harms”
are references to that concept.297 This means that as long as
there is a match between the harm foreseen and the harm
experienced, the foreseeability test is satisfied. To further
clarify this point, third, the test makes clear in its emphasis
of “general kinds of harm” that the manner in which the
harm occurred does not matter. This is commonly held true
in proximate cause.298
In terms, then, of the cost-benefit formula of B, P, and
L, where the B represents the private burden, the L
represents the various harms, each caused by a number of
possible occurrences defining the Ps, and the P represents
the probabilities of the occurrence of the Ls, the
foreseeability test is concerned with the Ls, the harms that
were foreseen.
For example, suppose that a father, to teach his son
to swim, throws him off a cliff into the sea. The son drowns.
Since the father was in breach of duty owed his son because
of the foreseeability of his son’s death, a harm recognized by
negligence law,299 and because the son died, the father
proximately caused his death. On the other hand, suppose
Bill, returning from a hunting trip, decides to drop by the
house of his friend, David.300 In the yard, he greets David’s
nine-year-old daughter, Amy, and hands her his small, light,
negligence duties to run to specific individuals and negligent breaches to
be of such duties, then the harm foreseen is already specific to the
individual harmed; this extra requirement is extraneous.
295 Again, it bears emphasis that one cannot properly pose this question to
abstract actions and causes lacking any characteristic.
296 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 4.
297 At least, this shall be the interpretation here.
298 DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 257, § 207.
299 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 4 (AM. LAW
INST. 2000).
300 This is essentially the third illustration of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29.
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but loaded shotgun, telling her to put it in the barn. He then
turns to David, who is standing on the porch. Amy drops the
shotgun and hurts her toe. While Bill is in negligent breach
for giving Amy the shotgun, since she might accidentally
have shot it, he has not proximately caused Amy’s injury to
her toe, since that harm was not foreseeable. As still another
example, consider the case presented in Dobbs’s treatise.301
Post Office workers left uncovered a manhole surrounded by
kerosene lanterns. Two boys went down the manhole, came
back up, and hit a lantern that fell, causing gas to escape
that subsequently exploded. One of the boys fell and was
burned. Since the boy suffered from the type of harm
otherwise foreseen, there was proximate causation, even
though the harm, occurring by explosion rather than
mischievous ignition of the kerosene, came about in an
unforeseen fashion.
This definition must be carried to its appropriate
conclusion. Suppose the infuriated Fando beats Lis to a state
of indeterminate life, but, before killing her, remembers his
broken drum and leaves to cry over it. Lis, convinced that
Fando does not love her, kills herself. Has Fando proximately
caused Lis’s death? Fando’s attack could foreseeably have
resulted in Lis’s death, and Lis died. Under the definition of
the foreseeability test, without more,302 Fando has
proximately caused Lis’s death. 303

2. THE RISK TEST

DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note 257, § 207.
“Most often courts can rightly ignore the details about the manner of
injury, because the defendant’s negligence is broad enough to cover a
variety of sequences, motives and events. However, the problem is not
resolvable by a rule of law. If the facts of a particular case show that the
risk of harm was limited to a very specific kind of accident, the manner in
which harm was inflicted will be relevant.” Id.; see also id. §§ 209–215
(discussing intervening acts and superseding causes); MODEL PENAL CODE
PART I COMMENTARIES 255 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (redefining harms with a
specificity that includes causes). But see infra, note 309 (remarking that
the complications of the foreseeability test merely carry it towards the risk
test). The risk test, as this note shall show, does not need “more.” Accord
Barry v. Quality Steel Prods, Inc., 820 A.2d 258 (Conn. 2003); Control
Techniques, Inc. v. Johnson, 762 N.E.2d 103 (Ind. 2002).
303 For an example of when the foreseeability test would not imply
proximate causation when one would expect legal causation to exist, see
the example of the falling chandelier, supra Part V.D.2.
301
302
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The definition of the risk test is concise: “An actor’s
liability is limited to those harms that result from the risks
that made the actor’s conduct tortious.”304
According to the Restatement, “risk” consists of
“harm occurring with some probability.” Understood this
way, the risk test states: “An actor’s liability is limited to
those harms that result from the harms that made the actor’s
conduct tortious.” This statement is semantically void, or at
the very least does not mean anything it could have been
intended to mean. This note accepts the definition of
proximate causation given in the risk test as sound but
reinterprets “risk” as a harm-producing event. For example,
drunk driving bears the “risk” of car accidents, but not the
“risk” of a crushed foot, which is a “harm.”305
In terms of B, P, and L, the risk test is concerned with
the P’s, the situations that give rise to the harms. For
proximate causation, what matters is whether the situations
of which the objectively reasonable person feared in
considering the action that constituted negligent breach
occurred. What harm occurred is insignificant. Liability is
constrained “to the reasons for holding the actor liable in the
first place.”306 The jury in assessing proximate causation
should be told to return to those reasons that made it find
the actor negligent.307 That what harm occurred is
insignificant appears to conflict with the Restatement, which
seems to insist that the harm be foreseeable.308
For example, suppose a drunk politician entered his
car and started driving. This act is negligent because it risks
the politician driving into a person or an object. While he is
driving, the politician is subject to an attentat. His car is
blown up, causing injuries to his surroundings. The
politician cannot be deemed liable for those injuries because
they did not occur from a foreseeable risk. Ordinarily, the
politician’s action would not be deemed negligent because of
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29. The
Restatement calls this test the “risk standard.” Id. cmt. d.
305 The Restatement itself is inconsistent on this point. See, e.g., id. § 29
ills. 3-5 (treating quite clearly “risk” as this note defines it, not as “harm”).
306 Id. § 29 cmt. d.
307 Id.
308 Id. § 29 cmt. h. While one could insist that to find proximate cause the
risks also cause foreseeable harms, the requirement would conflict with
the observation that the risks were what made the act negligent, not the
specific harms that the risks would cause.
304
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the risk that he would fail to realize his car had been rigged.
In Buñuel’s That Obscure Object of Desire, where politicians
are constantly being assassinated, he might be.309
Reconsider the case of the hunter and his shotgun.
Suppose the hunter Bill gave his shotgun to Amy who, this
time, dropped it onto a crystal, shattering the crystal and
making the gun go off and strike David. Because the risk was
that Amy would accidentally shoot the gun, and because
Amy did not accidentally shoot the gun, Bill cannot be held
liable for either David’s injury or the property damage. It
would be incongruous to hold Bill not liable for the crystal
but liable for David’s physical injuries, which occurred
through an even greater stretch of fate. The Restatement
disagrees, finding Bill not liable for the crystal but liable for
David’s physical injuries because the gun went off.310
To further clarify the difference between the two
tests, consider the following two examples. In each example,
solely one test implies proximate causation. Suppose there
exists a large vat of very hot liquid in a room that had a big
lid. The liquid is used for work. A person negligently drops
the lid into the vat. The liquid, unexpectedly, splashes very
high, melting the chain of the room’s chandelier, which falls,
crushing the victim, who dies. The risk test recognizes that
the risk of negligently dropping the lid into the vat is the
occurrence of a splash. A splash occurred. Harm resulted
from the splash. There is proximate cause. Meanwhile, the
foreseeability test recognizes the possibility of burns. Death
(by being crushed by a chandelier) is not a foreseeable harm
of a person negligently dropping a lid into a vat of hot liquid.
There can be no proximate cause here.
Now consider a chemist who is very bored and decides
to make some trinitrotoluene. A few days later, to motivate
himself during a bout of existential angst, he takes the TNT
from its safe position from a high shelf and looks at it for a
while, lounging in his chair and considering its power. He is
called downstairs. He places the TNT on a table and leaves
See also id. § 29 ills. 7-8 (liability for harm caused by a fall in a parking
lot due to the dark, but no liability without more for the same harm caused
by a thief tripping the victim).
310 Id. § 29 cmt. h. Under this approach, it appears that if an uncommonly
strong wind suddenly hit right after Bill gave Amy the shotgun that made
the shotgun go off, injuring David, then Bill would be liable for David’s
injuries, because the shotgun had gone off.
309
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his lab. Soon, kids arrive for a party. The chemist decides to
show his lab to the kids. They enter the lab, and he
negligently keeps the TNT on the table. An earthquake
occurs, the TNT falls and explodes, causing injury. The
foreseeability test recognizes that the chemist’s act was
negligent because of the possibility that the TNT would
explode, causing injury. The TNT exploded, causing such
injury. There is proximate causation. The risk test recognizes
the chemist’s act is negligent because it creates a risk that a
child would take the TNT and cause it to explode, not that
an earthquake would occur, causing the TNT to fall and as a
result explode. It does not matter that the resulting harms
were the same. There can be no proximate causation.311
As a final example, consider the following
hypothetical drawn from Gaspar Noé’s film, Climax,312 which
won the Directors’ Fortnight at the Cannes Film Festival.313
(Readers who do not wish to consider a violent example are
advised to skip this paragraph). Suppose in an isolated
school in a forest miles from the city, during a panic of a
dance troupe induced by the consumption of LSD through a
spiked sangria, a pregnant woman is punched and kicked in
the stomach, placing her life at risk. The originally pregnant
woman accosts her assailant with a knife, but instead of
killing her, starts to cut herself. She bleeds to death over the
next few hours while crawling in the snowstorm outside. Has
her assailant negligently caused her death? Negligence is
intricately linked to our conceptions of society and humanity,
as the social experiment in the movie can indicate: Is the
person who secretly spiked the sangria that caused the panic
liable in negligence for the harms that ensued (which, in a

The foreseeability test can claim that there is proximate causation in
the first example by calling the lid’s fall into the vat a “force likely to cause
unpredictable and diverse harms.” DOBBS, HAYDEN & BUBLICK, supra note
257, § 207. It can claim that there is no proximate causation in the second
example by calling the earthquake a “superseding cause.” RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). To the extent that the
complications of the foreseeability test carry one unique, clear definition
towards another unique, clear definition, the correct test to adopt is the
one using the second definition.
312 CLIMAX (Rectangle Prods. & Wild Bunch 2018).
313 Zack Sharf, Gaspar Noé Wins Biggest Directors’ Fortnight Prize with
‘Climax,’ One of the Best-Reviewed Films at Cannes, INDIEWIRE (May 17,
2018, 1:50 PM), https://www.indiewire.com/2018/05/gaspar-noe-winsdirectors-fortnight-prize-climax-1201965827.
311
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complete breakdown of the group, include a child’s
electrocution, incest, and murder)?

3. PALSGRAF
This note concludes with an analysis of Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad Co.314 While the application to Palsgraf
primarily clarifies the duty and breach framework of the
note, I have included it here because Justice Andrews’s
dissent discusses proximate cause.315
This note recognizes that Palsgraf is an old and
theoretical case, which is a difficult combination.316 As a case
nevertheless from the 20th century, it is manageable.
The facts of Palsgraf are short.317 Two men318
attempted to board a train that was departing.319 The first
got on safely; the second had difficulty.320 One guard on the
train and another on the platform tried to help the second
man get onto the train.321 In the commotion, the second man
dropped a nondescript package that, it turned out, contained

Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
Indeed, it has been suggested that Justice Andrews’s dissent is about
proximate cause. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and
Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1761-62 (2012). This is not strictly
true. The key disagreement between the majority and the dissent lies in
the nature of duty and, by extension, breach. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
But since it was uncontested that under Andrews’s view, there was a duty
that was breached, Andrews discussed the remaining element, proximate
cause, which he emphasized to be the chief limitation under his more
expansive negligence theory, in order to affirm the decision below. See id.
at 101-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting); STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., 3 AMERICAN
LAW OF TORTS § 11.7, Westlaw (database updated March 2020). Justice
Andrews’s rhetoric attempting to justify his approach by emphasizing the
existence of a limitation on it does not make his dissent of proximate cause
instead of duty, no more than a garden of apple trees ceases to be a garden
of apple trees and becomes an orange grove, because it has been
circumscribed from a larger forest of apple trees. The fence merely better
describes the apple garden.
316 See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 315, at 1758, 1760–62 (discussing
interpretational complexities of the case).
317 For a discussion of the real-life facts, see William H. Manz, Palsgraf:
Cardozo’s Urban Legend?, 107 DICK. L. REV. 785 (2003).
318 Technically, the “men” were boys. Joseph W. Little, Palsgraf Revisited
(Again), 6 PIERCE L. REV. 75, 75 (2007).
319 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99.
320 Id.
321 Id.
314
315
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fireworks.322 The fireworks exploded, causing scales at the
other end of the platform many feet away to fall, injuring the
plaintiff.323 The plaintiff sued the railroad company for
negligence under a vicarious liability theory.324
The question in Palsgraf, then, is whether the
plaintiff has a cause of action under negligence against the
two workers who help the second man board the train.
Justice Cardozo, who wrote for a majority of four in a
court of seven, held that she did not. Justice Cardozo’s
primary argument was that the plaintiff was suing for
negligent breach of the general duty of care, and that duty
ran to her specifically.325 Therefore, for the workers’ actions
to constitute breach, the harm must have been foreseeable
as to her.326 In the case, it was uncontested that harm to the
plaintiff was not foreseeable through the workers’ actions.327
Thus, there was no breach and no negligence; the case had
to be dismissed.328
There have been arguments that Cardozo held the
workers owed no duty to the plaintiff.329 While this may be a
correct exercise in divination,330 it finds almost no support in

Id.
Id.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 99, 102. On the other hand, there was negligence as to the holder
of the package. E.g., id. at 99. As such, Cardozo says: “The victim does not
sue derivatively, or by right of subrogation, to vindicate an interest
invaded in the person of another. Thus, to view his cause of action is to
ignore the fundamental difference between tort and crime. He sues for
breach of a duty owing to himself.” Id. at 101 (citations omitted). This
statement, which apparently has caused confusion among scholars, see
Zipursky, supra note 315, at 1768, is easily explained—if it needs
explanation—as a response to the dissent, which, Cardozo finds, in
practice states the opposite. Unsurprisingly, then, one finds in the dissent
the following almost indignant response: “[W]e do not have a plaintiff
suing by ‘derivation or succession.’ Her action is original and primary.”
Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
328 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
329 E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 29 cmt. f
(AM. LAW INST. 2000); Little, supra note 318, at 78. It has even been said,
as a basic setup to the Palsgaf issue, that for the defendant to be absolved
of liability, the court had to find either that there was no duty or that there
was no proximate cause. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 315, § 11.7. This is
rather frustrating.
330 But see Zipursky, supra note 315, at 1758, 1762 (arguing that it is not).
322
323
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the opinion.331 It relates to the old idea of using foreseeability
to find duty,332 wherein the general duty of care is constantly
disappearing and reappearing like a quite inconsistent
phoenix.333 The sole support this interpretation finds lies in
the following quotation: “The risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is
risk to another or to others within the range of
apprehension.”334 But absent any other support, “duty” here
is more properly interpreted as the duty to commit a specific
act, not as the general duty of care. This is similar to how a
defense attorney would argue that any act (for the plaintiff
must have specified an act or particular inaction) is not
negligent, because there was no “duty” to perform it,
converting the jury question of breach to a question of law for
the judge, except that Cardozo, who held under the
circumstances that there was no breach as a matter of law,
had no reason to be attentive to the difference.
Andrews, writing in dissent, rejected Cardozo’s
interpretation of the general duty of care, arguing that there
is a solitary general duty of care that runs to society at large,
instead of multiple duties running to individuals.335 It is that
Indeed, quite the opposite is true. See Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99-100
(“The plaintiff, as she stood upon the platform of the station, might claim
to be protected against intentional invasion of her bodily security. Such
invasion is not charged. She might claim to be protected against
unintentional invasion by conduct involving in the thought of reasonable
men an unreasonable hazard that such invasion would ensue. These, from
the point of view of the law, were the bounds of her immunity, with
perhaps some rare exceptions, survivals for the most part of ancient forms
of liability, where conduct is held to be at the peril of the actor [i.e., strict
liability]. If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an
act innocent and harmless, at least to outward seeming, with reference to
her, did not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened to be a
wrong . . . with reference to some one else. ‘In every instance, before
negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought
and found a duty to the individual complaining, the observance of which
would have averted or avoided the injury.’” (emphasis in both cases added)
(citations omitted)). Parenthetically, the historical statement on the
development of strict liability has been questioned. See generally Robert
L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A
Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925 (1981).
332 See, e.g., Little, supra note 318, at 82–88.
333 See, e.g., Quiroz v. Alcoa Inc., 416 P.3d 824, 828-29, 833-35 (Ariz. 2018)
(agreeing with the Restatement Third in rejecting foreseeability as a factor
in determining duty).
334 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
335 Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
331
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single duty that must be violated for there to be breach. As
such, Andrews appears to suggest that there is breach
whenever there is, in Cardozo’s language and the language
of this note, breach as to one person. Indeed, Andrews agrees
that there can be no breach in the air.336 Thus, for example,
if a person speeds in an empty city, there is no breach.
Therefore, breach as to at least one person, as defined in this
note, is necessary.337 The key focus of Andrews’s argument is
that it is also sufficient. Hence, if there is breach in the
language of this note as to one person, there is breach in
Andrews’s language as to “society at large,” and thus breach
as to every person in the language of this note.
It bears emphasis that in both the Andrews
conception and the Cardozo conception, there must be a duty
that is being breached.338 The breach and duty elements of
negligence are, in that sense, united. 339 There is no evidence
that, given a duty, Andrews and Cardozo contest the nature
of breach.340 Their difference lies in the (relational) nature of
the general duty of care. This note’s approach to the general
duty of care matches that of Cardozo.341 While Andrews’s
approach is more sophisticated, it is not the law. 342 Perhaps
one day it will be, but it is not at that point yet.
The rest of Andrews’s dissent concerns proximate
cause, which he emphasizes remains a part of the negligence
cause of action.343 Since by construction, Andrews lacks a
Id. at 102.
Technically, this is not true. Suppose that a person is walking down an
empty street in an otherwise occupied city, swinging a bat. He loses
control, the bat flies into an adjacent street, striking a pedestrian. In the
conception of this note, there is no breach, because harm to the pedestrian
was not foreseeable. In Andrews’s version, the actor, in swinging a bat in
an occupied city, engaged in an act that unreasonably threatened the
safety of others, hence was in breach of the general duty of care. In both
conceptions, there would have been breach had a pedestrian suddenly
appeared in the street and gotten hit by the swinging bat still in the actor’s
hand.
338 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
339 Id.
340 See id. at 101-05; id. at 99-101 (majority opinion).
341 This was an interpretational rather than a normative choice. In other
words, it describes the status of the law, but makes no statement on what
the law should be. It does not follow necessarily from considering the
general duty of care part of the social contract.
342 See Little, supra note 318, at 81-82 (Wisconsin being the only
exception).
343 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
336
337
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breach framework to guide his proximate cause analysis, his
approach to proximate cause differs from that in this note.
He appears to define proximate cause in the manner of the
criminal law.344 To clarify his approach to proximate cause,
Andrews offers the following example: Suppose a chauffeur
negligently collides into another car.345 Suppose that car
contained dynamite, unforeseeably to the reasonable man,
and that the dynamite exploded, cutting by flying glass a
person sitting at a window a block away.346 Andrews argues
in this case, where his conception would find duty and
breach, that it was conceivable there was no proximate
cause.347 He emphasizes foreseeability as a factor in the
proximate cause analysis of the hypothetical.348 Agreeing
with the foreseeability analysis, this note would find that
there was no breach of the duty of care running to the person
at the window. One wonders, however, what distinguishes
for Andrews this case from Palsgraf, and Andrews admits
that his conception of proximate cause is amorphous.349
“What is a cause in a legal sense, still more what is a
proximate cause, depend in each case upon many
Id. at 104 (asking, for example, whether there was “a natural and
continuous sequence between cause and effect,” whether there was a
“direct connection . . . without too many intervening causes,” whether the
cause and result were close in space and time, etc.). In the approach of this
note, prolonged causation and the existence of intervening causes may be
relevant to breach through foreseeability of harm to a particular plaintiff,
but are not ipso facto relevant to proximate causation. As long as the harm
occurred through the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious, there
would be proximate causation. Of course, prolonged causation and
intervening causes might even imply that the actor’s conduct was not
tortious at all.
In contrast, Andrews attaches significance to prolonged causation
in and of itself. See id. at 103 (an overturned lantern that burns all of
Chicago is not the proximate cause of the burning of the last house).
The following question on the risk test poses itself, clarifying its
nature and demonstrating the extent to which proximate causation has
little to do with causation as one would ordinarily understand the term.
Suppose Actor A committed an act negligent with respect to V1 and V2
through risks R1 and R2 respectively. Suppose, unexpectedly, V1 was
injured through risk R2. Is A liable in negligence to V1? The answer, it
appears, should be “No”: Proximate cause is linked to the breach of duty,
which, under current law, is linked to a specific individual.
345 Id. at 104.
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Id.
349 See id.
344
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considerations . . . .” 350 Perhaps in the hypothetical, it is the
increased distance between the location of the accident and
the location of the harm.

VI. CONCLUSION
In the negligence cause of action, the element of duty
goes beyond the general duty of care to act reasonably under
the circumstances. Any duty could potentially satisfy this
element, although the duty must be considered a "tort" duty,
i.e., one over which the negligence cause of action can run. It
is therefore misleading to speak of duty as a separate
element of the negligence cause of action, which is always
met by some duty, such as by a non-derogable statutory duty.
What matters is the combination of a duty and the breach of
the duty.
For the negligence cause of action, the breach must be
“negligent.” Negligent breach of a duty is a concept that
otherwise stands independently of its role in the negligence
cause of action. It is a type of broad culpability mens rea, as
opposed to elemental mens rea. Where the duty in question
is a tort duty, negligent breach satisfies the traditional
second element of the cause of action.
An actor negligently breaches a duty through an act
or through inaction if (and only if) a reasonable person in the
actor's position could foresee the nonoccurrence of the result
of the duty, and a cost-benefit analysis weighs against the
actor.

Id. at 103. Of course, actual cause is not subsumed under proximate
cause. For example, suppose a bored babysitter takes a box and starts
counting the matches inside, throwing each onto the floor after counting
it. The kitchen contains a bottle of compressed butane gas and a vat of oil
in which a cast iron pot is being cleaned. Having counted all the matches,
the babysitter then goes to the vat, takes out the pot, and examines it for
a while, dripping oil over the ground. Meanwhile, the baby, himself bored,
goes into the shed, where he plays with the lantern and lights up the shed.
The fire spreads and consumes the house, lighting in the process the
matches and the oil, and causing the bottle of butane gas to explode. The
babysitter’s spoliation of the kitchen is not an actual cause of the house
burning, neither under the but-for test nor under the substantial factor
test, but it is a proximate cause, as it contributed to the fire through the
risks that made the babysitter's conduct negligent.
350
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The first prong of the test, the foreseeability of harm,
carries an actor’s conduct within the ambit of negligence. It
recognizes that we must be vigilant, as reasonable people, to
whether our conduct could result in harm. The mere
foreseeability of harm, however, cannot suffice. Since actions
could often result in harm, the fear of being deemed
negligent would shackle an actor, discouraging actions that
could well be preferred. As a result, the law allows the actor
the possibility of engaging in the conduct, requiring that the
actor assess the benefits and costs—properly understood—of
the conduct, to ensure that the benefits exceed the costs.
Only if the costs exceed the benefits can the conduct be
deemed negligent. In this fashion, the law ensures both
individual liberty and the well-being of others.
The two elements of the negligence test, the
nonoccurrence of the result of a duty and the cost-benefit
analysis, clarify the relationship between duty and breach,
and unify the approach of law and economics with the other
approaches to breach, such as the rights-based approach,
which emphasize different aspects of the same underlying
solution to the problem.
In those cases where an actor’s conduct negligently
breaches a duty, one can raise the last of the difficult issues
of the negligence cause of action, the proximate cause
question: Did the harms result from the risks that made the
actor’s conduct negligent? This is the risk test, which is both
normatively superior to the foreseeability test and concludes
its historical development. Proximate causation here
substantially differs from that of the criminal law, which
uses a free-form factor test still in its infancy.
At this point, there are two potential developments of
the negligence cause of action that could be beneficial. First
is the reinterpretation of the general duty of care to run to
society at large, rather than to individuals, as suggested by
Andrews in Palsgraf. As we move toward a greater
appreciation of the relationship between the individual and
society, a phenomenon I shall describe and analyze in my
forthcoming book, this approach might gain traction. Second
is the reinterpretation of the negligence cause of action itself
to apply only to the general duty of care. This approach—
encompassing great change—would simplify the negligence
cause of action, removing the first element as well as the use
of a broad culpability mens rea in negligence cases. Instead
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of differentiating between strict and negligent breaches of
entire duties, one would only speak of breaches of duties.
This would comport with developments in the criminal law,
which as a field is moving away from the use of broad
culpability mens rea towards elemental rea.

